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Introduction
Plant closings are a lot like funerals. Objectively, we all have to diedying is part of life and as the sermon usually goes, death gives rise
to new life. Economists have argued in their dispassionate, objective
fashion that plant closure is simply the other side of opening new plants
and that the mobility of physical resources adds vitality to an economy,
which in turn helps promote the general welfare. Plant closing is not
always a good thing, however, and no one would be foolish enough
to argue that. Both death and plant closings can sometimes be prevented.
"Premature" plant closings are a social waste and a terrible personal
tragedy to those directly affected. Any shutdown of a manufacturing
or service facility has significant private and social consequences as
human resources are displaced. Plant closure is all the worse when it
could have been avoided.
Research on the problem of plant closure has taken two directions.
The first is to measure and describe the consequences of decisions to
close. 1 The second relates to the alternative courses of action available
to government, employees, and employers to ameliorate these conse
quences with the more sophisticated research attempting to evaluate these
alternatives. 2 Understanding the consequences of closure and evaluating
alternatives to deal with it are important, but recently McKersie &
McKersie have suggested, "the best way to deal with potential job loss
is to prevent it if this can be done by some sensible basis." 3 Unfor
tunately, aside from the McKersie & McKersie report, few research
findings on the issue of closure prevention are available. 4 How can plant
closing be prevented? Which cases are "preventable"? Why aren©t the
necessary preventive steps always taken? Why are they taken in some
cases? These are the questions addressed in this study.

Scope and Outline of the Study
This study is not about the preservation of plants and jobs that are
no longer economically viable. Rather it is about why plants get that
way and how to prevent it from happening prematurely. To understand
why Cleveland©s "anchor industries" were declining and why its jobs
were being located elsewhere, the McKinsey and Company staff for
the Cleveland Tomorrow Committee interviewed chief executives, con
ducted case studies, and surveyed trade literature concerning these in1
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dustries. The three critical factors they identified in Cleveland©s decline
were high union labor costs, increased foreign competition and low
capital investment. With respect to union labor costs, the report cited
above average wage rates in Cleveland, restrictive work rules and the
legacy of poor labor-management relations. 5
Chapter 1 of this study analyzes the causes for a plant©s loss of
economic viability, recognizes that labor factors are only part of the
equation, and raises a series of questions about short- and long-run
phenomena that impinge on the plant closing decision.
Chapter 2 describes several plant closures in Northeast Ohio. Declining
markets, increased competition from more efficient producers, and ob
solete facilities were the proximate causes for closure in the three cases
discussed. High labor costs and a "poor labor climate" had a bearing
but were not the immediate cause for closure. These cases form a
backdrop for understanding plant closure and illustrate the complexity
of the process. The major lesson of chapter 2 is that closure is not the
result of one simple, "point-in-time" decision. Rather, closure results
from a series of earlier events and decisions in which local decisionmakers, managers and union representatives have often played a signifi
cant role. At least two of the closures discussed in chapter 2 may well
be viewed as "the legacy of a poor labor climate."
Chapter 3 reviews four cases in which labor relations issues played
a direct part in the threatened closure. These cases show that not all
labor-management relationships are hopelessly combative, however. In
all four cases, work rule changes significantly reduced labor costs, and
improved labor-management relations promise productivity improve
ment in the future. In economic terms, these firms have found it more
cost effective to invest in a reversal of their combative labor-management
relationship than to exit the area.
As this study progressed and tentative conclusions were reached, it
became clear that cases involving explicit threats of closure represented
only the potential failures in the process of preserving plants and jobs.
Limiting the study to them would be like studying collective bargain
ing by looking only at cases where strikes had occurred. Chapter 4
remedies this shortcoming by introducing two cases where no explicit
threat to close was made, but the implications for job security of a failure
to act were clear to all. Both cases involve decisions to locate new
facilities in close proximity to existing plants whose state of obsolescence
was progressing rapidly. Thus, chapter 4 is really about bargaining for
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job security with a long-term perspective as much as it is about saving
jobs that are threatened by a near-term plant closure.
Chapter 5 summarizes the findings of the earlier chapters and sug
gests some public and private policy conclusions. Although definitive
answers do not come from a study of this kind, it is perhaps more im
portant that people concerned with the issues posed here ask the right
questions. If this report achieves that much it will have been a success.
NOTES
1. For discussions of these consequences, see for example James L.Stern,
"Consequences of Plant Closure," Journal of Human Resources, VII, 1
(Winter 1972) pp. 3-12; Robert L. Aronson and Robert B. McKersie, Final
Report: Economic Consequences of Plant Shut-downs in New York State, New
York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, May
1980, pp. iii-x, 1-171; Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, The Deindustrialiiation of America (New York: Basic Books, 1982); Hearings U.S.
Senate, September 1980; John Hughes, Industrial Restructuring: Some Man
power Aspects, Discussion paper No. 4, National Economic Development Of
fice, Millbank, London, May 1976; Stephen S. Mick, "Social and Personnel
Costs of Plant Shutdowns," Industrial Relations 14 (May 1975) pp. 203-208;
Jeanne P. Gordus, Paul Jarley, and Louis A. Ferman, Plant Closings and
Economic Dislocation (Kalamazoo, MI: W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employ
ment Research, 1981).
2. See for example Robert B. McKersie and Werner Sengenberger, Job Losses
in Major Industries: Manpower Strategy Responses, Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, Paris, 1983.
3. Robert B. McKersie and William S. McKersie, Plant Closings: What Can
Be Learned from Best Practice (Washington, DC: Government Printing Of
fice, 1981, p. 4).
4. See Wayne R. Wendling, The Plant Closure Policy Dilemma (Kalamazoo,
MI: W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1984) for a discussion
of the potential role of collective bargaining in saving plants and the public
policy alternatives associated with such a role.
5. Cleveland Tomorrow A Strategy for Economic Vitality, Cleveland Tomor
row Committee, December 1981, pp. 5-6.
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The Economics of Plant Closure
Some Research Questions
The economist offers a simple answer to the question of why a par
ticular plant closed it was no longer profitable. A slightly more com
plex version is that the profitability of the plant fell below a minimal
threshold level for the company so that an alternative investment of the
capital embodied in the plant was preferable to continued operation.
Such economic explanations are helpful in focusing on the problem,
but they do not begin to answer the next question why is the plant no
longer profitable? Why is the plant "uncompetitive"? Why has it not
been "modernized"? Why are labor or other factor costs higher than
elsewhere, or why did demand fall? These questions require an institu
tional examination of the ceterus considered by economic theory to be
paribus.
In particular, this study focuses on the labor factor and its relative
importance in decisions to close plants. Other factors cannot be ignored
and there is no intention in this study of sweeping them under the rug
or suggesting that if all the labor factor issues could be resolved, plants
would go on forever. Such a conclusion is simply not true. The labor
factor has been identified as a key element in the competitiveness of
particular areas, however, so it is fair to attempt an evaluation of the
role of that factor despite a recognition that other factors affecting the
viability of a particular plant may overwhelm the labor element.

Response to Change
Among the factors economists identify as contributors to a plant©s
decline is its inability to respond to external changes in product and
factor markets or to internal opportunities for technological advancement.

Short-Run Changes in the Product Market
The simplest example of a need for change may be the case where
new competitors erode the monopoly power of particular producers and
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force a decline in market price. To the extent that employees have shared
in the monopoly rents (profits) with their employer, there will necessarily
be a downward adjustment in labor costs, either through a more effi
cient utilization of labor or direct reduction of wages and benefits, if
the plant is to survive. "Concession bargaining" demonstrates that
downward adjustments are sometimes made. Such negotiations are
always difficult, in part, for reasons outlined in figure 1.1. The following
paragraph numbers correspond to the numbers in the Plant Closing
Negotiation Model.
1. Two kinds of employer motivation give rise to the possibility of
plant closing negotiations. A bonafide (1A) motivation is one where
the employer actually considers closing for reasons which may or may
not be related to the labor climate. Alternatively, an employer may use
the threat of plant closing as a bluff (IB) in an effort to gain bargaining
leverage.
To the external observer, including union leaders, distinguishing be
tween these two motivations may be difficult. Many employees believ
ed during the recession of the early 1980s that their company was tak
ing advantage of the economic times. With other plants closing, however,
any threat had to be taken seriously. 1 The appropriate response is ob
viously different in the two situations. A wrong conclusion for exam
ple, that (IB) exists when in fact (1A) is the case may be fatal. How
do unions distinguish? Are they now aware of mistakes they have made
in the past?
2. Given that an employer has a bonafide motivation, it may pro
ceed with an analysis of its operations, make a firm decision to close
its facilities, and then announce this decision to its employees and their
union (2A); or the employer may raise the matter for discussion with
its employees, perhaps by suggesting areas where labor cost considera
tions have a bearing on its closing decision (2B). When does an employer
initiate such discussions? Why? Under what circumstances does the
employer simply make the decision with no attempt to adjust labor cost
factors through discussions with the union?
2.1. The Supreme Court, federal circuit courts, and the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) have issued a number of decisions concern
ing the employer©s legal obligation to negotiate when a decision is made
to subcontract, close down facilities completely, or partially shut down
facilities. In First National Maintenance2 , The Supreme Court deter
mined that a firm was obligated to negotiate the impact or effect of its
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Figure 1
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decision to reduce its operations, but not to negotiate with respect to
the actual decision. In 1981, the International Union of Electrical
Workers sued Singer for closing a plant in Newark, New Jersey. Pan
try Pride was also sued by its unions in Baltimore after the company
closed a number of stores. 3 Does a legal requirement to negotiate, or
the threat of legal action, enhance the likelihood of success in saving jobs?
2.2. When an employer has had difficult labor-management relations
and has generally faced a union the employer feels is recalcitrant and
uncompromising, does that employer seek to avoid any contact with
the union and thus minimize the unpleasantness that is involved in the
plant closing decision? The employer may expect that the longer the
union is kept ignorant, the less harm the union can create. In short,
what, if anything, motivates an employer to conceal a plant closure
decision?
2.3. The employer who raises the issue of possible plant closing for
discussion may do so out of a hope that concessions might be made
or out of a loyalty to long-term employees and a concern for their wellbeing. What motivates an employer to raise the matter of plant closing
is a critical question, because unless the employer raises the issue in
a timely manner and offers to discuss it, there is a reduced likelihood
that anything can be done to save the plant.
3. When an employer makes a unilateral decision to close, union
leaders may not respond at all (3A); they may respond by initiating law
suits or other third party political action designed to forestall the clos
ing (3B); or they may request that the company reconsider its decision
and offer to discuss some of the labor cost aspects associated with it
(3C). The 3B and 3C responses may of course be combined where union
leaders are merely using the 3B response to gain leverage in the 3C
negotiations. Why is there no union response sometimes? Is it a lack
of interest or expertise to deal with the issues? Do leaders view the situa
tion as a lost cause? Do general labor market conditions affect their
response? How do leaders decide between 3B or 3C when they take
action? Is 3C the response most likely to yield success to keep the
plant open indefinitely? If it is, how can union leaders be encouraged
to take that alternative? What prevents their taking that approach?
4. Union response to an employer-initiated discussion is likely to be
motivated by the same considerations as a response to a unilateral
employer decision to close. Research questions 3 and 4 are, therefore,
closely related though not identical.

Economics of Plant Closure 9

When an employer initiates a discussion of labor costs, union leader
reaction may be favorable so that negotiations are undertaken (4A), or
negative so that no discussions are undertaken (4B). The employer in
itiative might also be treated in a perfunctory way so that no real negotia
tions occur. Union leaders may take a negative position on reopening
negotiations for strategic reasons related to the union©s position in other
bargaining units. For example, a refusal to meet might be motivated
by concern for the pattern-setting effect any concessions might have.
How important is this motive as a bar to negotiations on labor cost
factors?
5. Perhaps the most important question in this study is what
distinguishes successful (5A) from unsuccessful (5B) negotiations, once
the parties are at the table. Successful negotiations are, of course, defined
as those which maintain the plant. 4 When talks fail, is there generally
a miscalculation on the part of the union concerning employer motiva
tion (1A versus IB)? That is, does the union conclude that the employer
is bluffing when it is not? What other factors contribute to the failure
of talks? What are the factors which lead to successful talks? Is it ex
pertise and knowledge on the part of union negotiators concerning the
economics of the situation the plant faces? When do employers or unions
take a hard line in negotiations? Are their positions solely dependent
on economic factors, or are leadership styles, personality variables, or
other "nonrational" issues important to the outcome?
6. Where a union refuses to negotiate after a request from the employer
(4B), either the employer closes the plant (6A) or the plant remains
open (6B). When the latter happens, is it always safe to assume the
employer was bluffing?
7. Finally, with respect to figure 1.1, is there a distinction between
plants which remain open indefinitely (7A) and those which subsequently
close anyway (7B), even though substantial labor cost concessions have
been granted? Is it true that once concessions are requested it is usually
too late to save the plant? Many union negotiators are not convinced
that concessions save plants. 5

Long-Run Changes—a "Tragedy Scenario"6
One model for an Elizabethan tragedy calls for the introduction of
the hero©s dilemma in the first and second acts, a set of events leading
to a climax (the "handwriting on the wall") in the third act, and the
playing out of the inevitable tragic conclusion in the fourth and fifth
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acts. Even though this model may reflect poetic license, and not a very
good fit with the actual plays of Shakespeare, it does describe a pattern
that applies to some production facilities in Cleveland.
Perhaps as long as 30 years before a particular plant is closed, cor
porate planners are called upon to expand facilities for increased out
put or new product lines. At that point in time, a decision is made to
begin operations at an altogether new location. A variety of reasons
is given for choosing a new location rather than expanding at the ex
isting plant. Typically, they include availability of space at much lower
cost, proximity to new or expanding markets or to suppliers, and occa
sionally matters related to labor and human resources. Avoidance of
a militant union might be a factor, but this is often offset by the lack
of a trained or trainable labor force, particularly in industries where
there is special reliance on experienced or skilled workers.
Though it was not intended and never recognized as such, the deci
sion to expand production in an entirely new location may be the climax
of Act III. It is not part of a conscious 25-30 year long-term policy to
relocate the corporation to the Sun Belt, but it is the decision that deter
mines the eventual fate of the older original plant location. Once a plant
is established in a new location, expansion of that facility is often easier
than at the old location because planners have anticipated such needs
and purchased extra land in the initial new construction. After several
years, productivity and labor costs in the new plant are more favorable
than in the old plant because the newer plant was built and equipped
with the latest technology. As one union interviewee on this project
noted, "If they gave us the equipment those guys down South have,
we could make [product] twice as good as they do and twice as fast!
With the junk we have to work with it©s a wonder we get anything out
of this plant."
When the inevitable recession occurs, production cutbacks are or
dinarily scheduled for plants with the highest costs and lowest rates of
productivity. If production is permanently reduced, "consolidation"
or "rationalization" of production is concentrated into the more pro
ductive plants. Over a period of years, with successive expansions and
contractions, the inevitable decision is made to close the old site com
pletely. The only way to reverse such a process is via a new decision,
sometime prior to the ultimate phase-out, to introduce new products
or technology into the old plant. Such a decision can be made only when
relative cost advantages dictate it.

Economics of Plant Closure
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Need for continuous change. In the long run, all markets change. Con
sumer tastes, customer needs, factor markets, and technological changes
combine to assure that practically no product has an infinite life. In many
plants, the products produced and the technology in use change, thus
extending the life of the plant. In some plants, they do not. In view
of limited product life cycles, change is the sine qua non for remaining
viable. Part of the explanation for differences among plants is the percep
tion on the part of management concerning the ease with which change
could be introduced. A labor force that is thought to be rigid or unwill
ing to accept change would clearly stand as a "cost" in the evaluation
of whether change should be introduced. Such a cost is just as surely
an element in plant closing as "excessive wages." In fact, it may be
a more serious issue because its effects are insidious and irreversible
after some crucial point.
In this study, an attempt has been made to evaluate the relative im
portance of "labor force rigidity" as a factor contributing to the failure
to introduce timely investment that could preserve plants and jobs. The
research question is to what extent employee or union rigidity inhibits
or eliminates the flexibility that is necessary to sustain a plant. An
ticipating some of the study©s findings, this question has been expand
ed to look into the extent to which unions actually seek or pursue change
in product mix or technology in an effort to assure job security.
Greenfields closer to home. A good strategy for averting the tragedy
scenario altogether was demonstrated in two cases reported in chapter
4. Instead of relocating a new facility to an altogether different area
of the country, new "greenfield" plants were built in close proximity
(easy commuting distance) to the existing plant. New technologies and
the scope of the expansion projects demanded new plants, but contrary
to the usual tragedy scenario, these plants were built nearby, despite
the fact that more distant locations were seriously considered by manage
ment. Union leaders were called upon to make contract modifications
to accommodate the new plants, not only with respect to the conditions
and benefits of the yet-to-be-hired employees, but also for existing
employees.
Why do some union leaders comprehend the importance of plant loca
tion decisions and make the effort to influence them? When does manage
ment recognize the possibility of improving its overall relationship with
the union and take the risk of negotiating a matter that is clearly beyond
the purview of the NLRA©s mandatory scope of bargaining? What fac
tors contribute to the successful conclusion of such negotiations?
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Personalities and "Politics"
Rank-and-file resistance and union politics have also been cited as
a key factor in determining the success of negotiations when employers
ask for concessions. Such considerations may determine whether path
4A or 4B is followed in figure 1.1. Thomas Miner, vice-president of
labor relations for Chrysler was quoted recently on this. "Industry©s
problems at the bargaining table are not now with union leadership,
but with the rank-and-file." 7
The leadership on both sides of the labor-management relationship
appears to play crucial roles in determining whether particular plants
survive. Even leaders with Messianic traits cannot step into a situation
that lacks economic viability and save it. As noted above, this study
is not about such situations. Rather, this research question concerns plants
that appear to be economically viable, but ineffective leadership causes
premature closure. More broadly, the research question relates to the
importance of leadership and other noneconomic elements in determining
whether plants close prematurely. Why is it that union members vote
to reject concessions despite the fact that job loss will follow? Why does
such behavior, which appears irrational from an economic standpoint,
occur?

Summary
An underlying premise in this study has been that plants that have
lost their economic viability will be closed. No heroic effort will save
them. Many plants close prematurely, however. The most visible situa
tion involving premature closure is one where relatively short-run
changes in product market competition erode the monopoly rents of an
employer and require the downward adjustment of wages. Convincing
a union, and more important its constituents, that such adjustments are
necessary, is the crucial step in saving a plant in this situation. How
does that process work?
Cases where longer term change has not been accommodated are less
visible. That is, the closure seems inevitable when it occurs, but to those
who review the situation carefully, it is evident that actions could have
been taken to extend the life of the plant had they been undertaken ear
ly enough. New products and investment in new processes are crucial
throughout a plant©s life. The key question here is why such actions
were not taken in a timely fashion.
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Finally, noneconomic contributing elements cannot be dismissed. How
important are they in situations where potentially viable plants fail? Are
there systematic explanations for the failure of interpersonal or political
relationships?
The following chapters provide case examples that illustrate some
of the issues raised in this chapter. They provide partial and tentative
answers for some of the questions. Some readers will disagree with the
conclusions reported here. It is hoped that they will be inspired to offer
their own conclusions or, better still, engage in their own research to
better address the issues involved.
The usual caveat regarding the usefulness of case studies must be
entered. They raise more questions than they answer in any definitive
way.
NOTES
1. Wall Street Journal, October 13, 1982, p. 1.
2. First National Maintenance Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board,
452 US, 666 (1981).
3. Wall Street Journal, October 13, 1982, p. 16.
4. In the context of the "Tragedy Scenario" (see next section), even a partial
shutdown could be seen as a failure of plant saving negotiations. Where plants
are partially saved, however, there is still a chance for a "comeback" so each
case of a partial shutdown or retention must be judged individually as to whether
negotiations were a success.
5. Wall Street Journal, October 13, 1982, p. 16.
6. Thanks are due to Tommy McQuistion, former vice-president of Parker
Hannifin and executive-in-residence at the Weatherhead School of Manage
ment, 1982-83, for first calling the pattern described in this section to the
author©s attention.
7. Labor Relations Reporter, News and Background Information, 112 LLR
326 (April 1983).

2
Why Plants Close
In any dynamic economy, capital investments must be
retired at the end of their useful lives and replaced by more
productive investments. The industrial structure and its
geographic distribution respond to a variety of powerful
economic forces, including changes in prices, consumer
preferences, production technologies, and international trade
competition. The opening of new plants and closing of ob
solete plants are part of this vital process. 1
Joseph Schumpeter noted in 1898 that the opening and closing of
manufacturing facilities probably signifies economic health to the ex
tent that they assist growth and competitiveness. A major premise for
this study is that bona fide economic reasons lie behind virtually all
plant closing decisions. In many cases, those reasons are beyond the
control of local managers and other decisionmakers at the point when
the decision to close is under consideration. As noted in the preceding
chapter, however, if a longer-run perspective is used, the inevitability
of closure at the point when it occurs is not always so obvious.
The three cases of this chapter illustrate this point in widely divergent
ways. Some of the lessons to be learned from them are summarized
at the conclusion of the chapter.

Blue Water Seafood
The Blue Water Seafood plant was located on the west side of
Cleveland. Prior to its closure in 1979, it produced an "economy label"
seafood fillet. Frozen fish, processed on board ship, were purchased
by Blue Water, breaded, packaged and refrozen. Fish sticks and other
forms of "fish portions" were distributed through food brokers to
grocery outlets and the fast food trade.
The plant was built in 1964 by a Cleveland-based company that had
outgrown its original location. Shortly afterward, Gorton, a Boston15
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based national seafood distributor, purchased the Cleveland company
and added the plant to its chain of plants in New England, Alabama
and Canada. The plant had approximately 180 unskilled employees at
that time who had been unionized by the Meat Cutters (United Food
and Commercial Workers) in the late 1960s.
In 1975, Gorton was purchased by General Mills. Employment at
the plant continued to grow until it reached about 300 employees in
1979. Labor relations at the time of the purchase in 1975 were
characterized as poor by union and management interviewees. Both
agreed, however, that relations improved substantially after a new
manager was assigned by General Mills.
By 1979, the industry for food service fish portions was suffering
from overcapacity, with little growth opportunity and intense price com
petition. A new market trend for frozen food had become apparent
economy frozen foods were being displaced by "up-market"products
so Cleveland plant products saw a gradual decline in demand. The result
was very poor profit performance and return on investment in the
Cleveland plant. For that reason, in mid-April 1979, General Mills decid
ed to withdraw from large segments of the food service business which
the Cleveland plant supplied. The plant was closed on May 31.

Employer Decision
In late 1978, General Mills began to produce what later became known
as "light batter" products for the retail market. These products, in
cluding fish sticks, are of premium quality. At that time, the company
also reviewed its production capabilities at its three seafood production
plants in Massachusetts, Alabama and Cleveland. Although the
Massachusetts plant was somewhat older, it was a much larger plant
and offered the opportunity for consolidation and integration of opera
tions. Moreover, it produced primarily for retail product distribution.
The newer Alabama plant was the production location for a stuffed
seafood product for which demand was strong. The Cleveland plant
had neither the equipment nor the room to absorb production from the
plants in Alabama and Massachusetts. Conversely, Alabama and
Massachusetts had the capacity to absorb the entire output of the
Cleveland plant in economy-labeled fish sticks.
In short, the state of the frozen food market particularly for food
service products such as those produced in Cleveland dictated that the
company reduce its production capacity. Cleveland, through a combina-
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tion of factors, was the logical choice for closure. The Cleveland plant
was "stuck" with the economy label product that was slowly being phas
ed out by the company. The alternative sites had excess capacity or
were experiencing increasing demand in "up-market products" that were
compatible with the light batter products the company was about to
introduce.
All interviewees agreed that labor relations, including labor costs and
labor climate, were not a significant factor in the decision to close the
Cleveland plant. Although there had been two earlier strikes in the plant,
the labor relations climate had improved substantially between 1975
when General Mills acquired the plant and 1979 when the closure oc
curred. Hourly labor costs in Cleveland were the highest among the
three plants, but the relatively small difference was not an important
element in the company©s decision to close the Cleveland plant.
Union Awareness/Decision Process
General Mills now has a policy of providing as much prenotification
of closure or substantial layoff as possible to its unions and employees.
In the case of the Cleveland plant closing, however, only about six weeks
notice was given to the union. Although a concern for overcapacity and
shifting demand in the product market had been expressed at corporate
headquarters as much as a year earlier, a final decision to close the plant
had been made very swiftly and was carried out expeditiously.
The union representative received a call in late April 1979 from the
corporate industrial relations manager, who requested a meeting. When
the union representative and his business agent arrived, the corporate
representative simply announced that the plant would be closed on May
31. Union representatives were "stunned." They made several offers,
including a six- or nine-year no-strike pledge, but the company represen
tative indicated that the decision to close the plant was final. In manage
ment©s view, lengthier discussions with the union would have been
useless in this case since the decision to close the plant was unrelated
to the labor relations climate or to anything within the control of the
local union.
Further meetings between the parties were scheduled to discuss
severance benefits and related matters, but nothing more was discuss
ed concerning the decision to close. The plant did close on May 31,
1979 with the company meeting all its contractual obligations. The com
pany also made efforts to find jobs for displaced employees. The state
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of the Cleveland labor market at the time, however, was so poor that
little could be done to assist the employees.

Contributing Factors
The general labor relations climate at the plant had been good im
mediately prior to the closure. Four or five years earlier, however, at
the time Gorton purchased the seafood processing company, relations
were very poor. According to the union spokesperson, the replacement
of the personnel manager at the plant by General Mills was a major
step forward. Professional plant management had improved the per
formance of the plant and raised morale among the employees at the
plant. There had been a strike in August 1976 that was inopportune
from the union leadership©s standpoint, since it occurred during the sum
mer and covered a period when the plant was normally closed for sum
mer vacations.
No "outsiders" were ever involved in an effort to save the plant.
There was no external political pressure or assistance from the federal
mediation service. In the union©s view, there was no time to involve
such people.
Perhaps the most important contributing factor in the closure was the
state of the frozen food market particularly for economy brand pro
ducts such as those produced at the Cleveland plant. General Mills simply
had excess capacity and needed to reduce it. The management spokesper
son indicated that the entire industry was in difficult circumstances at
the time and that other companies subsequently closed facilities after
more substantial losses than General Mills had suffered in this case.
By the expedited closure of this plant, the corporation was able to reduce
losses, conserve capital, and position itself for a 1982-83 increase in
demand which occurred among the up-market brands of products. In
the management spokesperson©s opinion, the right decisions by the com
pany in a timely fashion in 1979 strengthened the corporation so that
employees at other locations benefited. Unfortunately, the employees
at the Cleveland location paid the price.
General Mills gave no thought to selling the facility to another pro
ducer of economy fish sticks or to some other manufacturer. The
breading mix manufacturing plant, located at the same site, is still in
operation. At the time of the closure, only 20 employees worked in
the breading plant, but now there are about 50, and employment is ex
pected to expand. Breading mixes have been profitable and their market
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has expanded. Customers include other food processors as well as
General Mills. The company has been well ahead of the market in
developing new types of breading mixes for light batter products so
that its breading facility in Cleveland has been particularly competitive.
General Mills also never considered the Cleveland plant for the in
troduction of new products. Although there have been minor additions
to existing facilities in other locations, the company has not added any
new free-standing facilities since 1979, and there has been no oppor
tunity to move a different product into the Cleveland plant.

Inferences
Perhaps the most important lesson from this case is that reliance on
a single product, narrowly defined even to its quality identity, can have
a fatal consequence for plants. The Cleveland plant had limited flex
ibility to adapt as its business climate became less profitable. Without
versatility or planning to replace products as they become obsolete, it
is not possible to save an otherwise productive facility. In this plant,
concentration on one product may have contributed to the efficient pro
cessing of fish sticks, but the absence of versatility led to the demise
of the plant when the market for its product declined.
The short time frame of advance notice to the union (six weeks)
precluded a thoughtful consideration of alternatives for the plant, but
it is not clear that a longer time frame would have been of benefit under
the circumstances. A more aggressive strategy by the union to pursue
either alternative products from the same corporation, or a demand that
the plant be turned over to a manufacturer who could use it, might have
been beneficial, however. 2
Finally, the poor quality of industrial relations earlier in the plant©s
history, 1970-1975, cannot be overlooked. That phenomenon is address
ed more directly below. Although it is purely speculative at this point,
a better climate coupled with union pressure for more investment or
product diversity could have altered the potential for saving the plant.
Custom Lumber Products3
Increased fuel and transport costs following the 1973 oil embargo
led to the closing of another Cleveland plant in 1984. Custom Lumber
Products, Inc., a Northeast Ohio sawmill, was purchased in 1969 to
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mill custom lumber products for Wood City, an Ohio chain of
lumberyards. In 1971, Wood City decided to build a new mill with
modern equipment and material handling facilities, along with substantial
storage capacity. Although pre-cut lumber was available from southern
and western suppliers, Custom Lumber offered unique services. For
example, specialized chemical treatments could be applied to custom
cut materials, all for very rapid delivery. Moreover, prior to the in
crease in transportation costs in 1973, it was more profitable for Wood
City to produce its own customized products than to rely on the more
limited lines available from distant suppliers.
Employees were unionized in the original plant purchased by Custom
Lumber Products. Drivers and warehouse workers at Wood City retail
outlets were also unionized by the same union. They were covered by
a separate contract, however.
Custom Lumber Product©s profitability suffered two sharp drops. Prior
to the 1973 oil embargo, the company operated in the black, but this
picture rapidly changed with increased gasoline prices. Transportation
costs for raw materials being shipped to the plant soared and the profit
margin fell to near zero. By 1983, southern (nonunion) mill competitors
reported average wage costs as low as $5 per hour, while wages in the
Ohio plant reached $9.50. Furthermore the company provided family
medical care at the same time that most of its competitors limited their
contribution for health insurance to employees only. Pension plan costs
of 38 cents per hour also reduced competitiveness since other suppliers
did not offer pension provisions. Finally, the 1982 recession and severe
depression of the western and southern mill industry led to price cut
ting by competitors. The imputed price at which Custom Lumber Pro
ducts sold its product to Wood City had to be cut in response, so Custom
Lumber©s margin fell below zero.
Naturally, Wood City wanted the plant to be profitable, but it would
have settled for breaking even on a yearly basis. It tolerated zero pro
fits because Custom Lumber provided customized processing services.
When the margin went negative, the plant could not be sustained.

Employer Decision
Western and southern lumber mills can supply only standard cut
lumber. This is a disadvantage since it limits the range of products Wood
City can offer and reduces its ability to respond to the unique needs
of customers. On the other hand, transportation costs for the finished
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products of those mills are lower than for those of Custom Lumber
because all processing wastes have been removed before the lumber
is shipped to Cleveland. Sawdust and scrap from milling is left behind.
This practice reduces transportation costs by about 20 percent compared
with products produced by Custom Lumber Products.
By late 1981, Custom Lumber had completed an analysis of relative
costs pertaining to the plant in Ohio. The negative results of this analysis
led management to consider closing the mill. The dilemma facing
management was simple. On one hand, it could continue operations,
have ready access to customized products and accept the fact that red
ink would flow. On the other hand, management could close the plant,
accept the loss of customized products and services, and order standar
dized cut lumber from a western mill. A third alternative, one that would
avoid this dilemma completely, was to persuade the union to agree to
concessions on wages and benefits, and thereby reduce labor costs.

Union Awareness
No information about the company©s 1981 studies of mill performance
or the dilemma facing management had been given to the union.
However, the local union president was fully aware of economic dif
ficulties in the lumber industry, so the specific problem at this mill came
as no great surprise. In a letter to the local union in January 1982, the
company declared that it would be unable to pay the cost-of-living ad
justment due later that month. Management proposed to meet with the
union to discuss the matter.
The local union in this case represented employees at a number of
different companies, not only Custom Lumber and Wood City. The local
union president was also a vice-president of the national union. He was
aware of negotiations in other parts of the country. Other union leader
ship at the plant level, however, was not nearly so sensitive to the
precariousness of the members© jobs. The plant manager noted the dif
ference among the union leaders. He commented that the local presi
dent©s "main interest was to keep the plant open and his members work
ing." The manager followed that statement with the more critical claim
that the plant©s business agent was ill-prepared to represent his members.
The business representative apparently had no appreciation for the
economics of the industry in which his members worked.
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Decision Process
In its January 1982 memo to the union, the company stated that it
would not be able to pay the cost-of-living increase scheduled to go
into effect that month. The plant manager expressed a willingness to
meet with union officials. Prior to that meeting, the union sent its auditor
into the mill to ascertain the financial status of the company. The com
pany willingly permitted this inspection. The auditor©s report indicated
that the company was losing about one-tenth of a cent on every board
foot of lumber in the plant. This report laid to rest any concern on the
part of the union that the company©s claim of an inability to pay was
unfounded.
After receiving his auditor©s report, the local union president was
convinced that the plant would shut down unless the operations could
break even on a consistent basis. He also understood that as the cost
of operating continued to escalate, Wood City, which owned Custom
Lumber Products, would be more inclined to eliminate customized mill
ing as an uncompetitive and impractical business practice.
The union agreed to open negotiations with the company concerning
this situation in late January 1982. During those negotiations, manage
ment sought an agreement on a wage freeze, including the cost-of-living
allowance. The company also wanted to eliminate two personal leave
days. The union, concerned that even concessions might not save the
plant, demanded an improvement in the severance pay clause if the mill
closed its doors permanently. Moreover, the union wanted Wood City
to give qualified employees top hiring priority at its retail outlets if the
mill went out of business.
During the course of the negotiations, the parties also discussed the
introduction of a new product in the plant. Wood City was about to
begin selling a product known as "prestwood," a product manufac
tured from sawdust that is combined with a glue and pressed into shelving
material. Management expected a growth in demand for this product
and believed that it would enhance overall profits at the plant. In part,
this expectation led management to accept a settlement without insisting
on wage cuts.
In September 1982, after seven months of negotiations, agreement
was reached. The union agreed to a three-and-one-half-year freeze on
wages, including the cost-of-living allowance and the elimination of two
personal leave days. In return, union members were assured of a
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severance allowance in the event of plant closure. The company also
agreed to the union©s demand that qualified employees would receive
hiring priority at Wood City if the mill ceased operation.

Contributing Factors
Although there was a change in plant management during the course
of these negotiations, the incoming plant manager had participated in
the negotiations from their inception, and there was no discontinuity
in the process. Moreover, the incoming plant manager actually wore
two hats one as new plant manager and the other as vice-president
for Wood City. For that reason, there was no difficulty coordinating
management©s position in negotiations. Management©s clear objective
throughout these negotiations was to reduce labor costs to a level suffi
cient to permit the plant to operate on a break-even basis. Specific
changes necessary to achieve this objective were negotiable.
On the union side, the local president had substantial credibility among
union members. The company©s presentations of its own financial situa
tion and descriptions of the wage and benefits programs of competitors
apparently convinced the employees that modification of the contract
was justifiable. When the contract was put before the membership for
ratification, union leaders unanimously endorsed the changes. Ratifica
tion was never in doubt.
Union-management relations at the mill prior to 1982 were har
monious. Only three or four grievances had ever reached the third step
of the grievance procedure, and there had never been an arbitration case
at the mill. Grievance activity increased, however, immediately after
the negotiation of the concession package in the latter part of 1982.
Management©s view was that employees regarded plant closure as in
evitable, a factor which severely lowered their morale. Employees
became more sensitive to changes being implemented by management
and were more likely to file grievances. A union spokesman hypothesized
that management was attempting to increase productivity by tightening
its application of work rules and by demanding higher levels of output
from individual employees. In this way, the company hoped to reduce
unit costs. The company had settled without a wage cut, at a higher
labor cost level than necessary for the plant to break even. As a result
other cost cutting methods were necessary to achieve the operating per
formance that management demanded. In the final analysis, this approach
did not work.
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Final Outcome
On April 11, 1985, the company announced that it would be closing
the mill. No particular reason, other than a continued loss on opera
tions at the mill, was cited by the company. Management determined
that neither the milling operation nor the storage facility were necessary
for efficient operation. The continued depression of the lumber industry
provided Wood City with buying opportunities that made it no longer
practical to operate the mill in Ohio. After the closure, Wood City began
to purchase lumber from mills in the West, and products were delivered
directly to individual retail outlets. Advances in inventory control
technology eliminated the need for warehouse storage facilities.

Inferences
Building the mill was predicated on management©s expectations about
transportation and relative labor costs. When these expectations were
not met, the mill became unprofitable.
In retrospect, it is unclear that any corrective action could have been
taken to assure the future of this plant. As in the case of Blue Water
Seafood, it is apparent that a limited-purpose facility such as this mill
is risky for both management and employees. As soon as transporta
tion costs altered the profit picture in 1973, the mill©s future was in
doubt. Perhaps if steps to change the product mix had been considered
earlier, there would have been a greater chance for survival. In the
12-year period between 1973 and 1985, only one product, the
"prestwood" project was introduced. It was "too little too late."
The union accepted all proposals by management for concessions.
Despite that, in retrospect, the union might have done more. With the
obvious advantage of hindsight, one can see that if the union had pressed
for more product mix, the mill might have been more likely to survive.
The only union request during 1983 negotiations was for an improve
ment in severance pay that was granted by management. In order to
keep any plant open indefinitely, provision for the introduction of new
products must be made. No such provision was made here, so closure
was inevitable in the long run. The "long run" was considerably shorten
ed by two factors: the sudden increase in energy prices in 1973 and
the severe depression of the lumber industry of the 1980s.
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Truck Components4
This truck parts plant had been the flagship of a Fortune 500 com
pany from its post-World War I inception. After several major addi
tions, the plant reached its peak employment with over 2,200 bargain
ing unit employees in the middle 1960s. Profitability at the plant began
to decline by the mid-1970s as imports of foreign trucks and truck parts
grew. The corporation and its competitors built facilities in the South
and abroad to counter the import threat. These new facilities were in
direct competition with the Cleveland plant.
A major decline in employment to 950 occurred in 1978 when the
corporation moved the manufacture of heavy duty and off-road truck
components to a new plant in the South. After that year, no new
employees were hired at the plant. The recession further reduced employ
ment to about 250 at the time the plant-saving negotiations began in
January 1982.

Employer Decision
In May 1981, the corporation established a management task force
to "look at what could be produced cheaper elsewhere." This review
project came to be known as "Phase 3." Earlier projects known as Phase
1 and Phase 2 had involved the development of southern production
facilities for the corporation and the movement of the heavy duty com
ponents line to the South. The goal of Phase 3 was to consider whether
it was economically justifiable to consolidate all production and the pro
totype production facilities of the Cleveland plant into one of the ex
isting southern locations. The complete closure of the Cleveland plant
would follow. The principal focus of the investigation was on labor
costs wage rates and output per manhour. The southern plant used
for comparison was unionized, but by a different international union.
Although it was obvious that labor costs per unit of output were substan
tially lower at the southern facility, it was not clear that the difference
would yield the target return on the investment cost of the move.

Union Awareness
The corporation made no effort to conceal its Phase 3 project. Infor
mal discussions were held between Cleveland plant managers and union
officials to let the latter group know about the corporate-level task force
and the potential for Phase 3. This knowledge quickly reached the plant
floor. The union was "desperate," according to a management
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spokesman. Hourly employment had dropped from approximately 2,200
people in 1967 to about 250 people at the time the Phase 3 news reach
ed the floor. Although the recession had suppressed employment at the
plant, maximum employment for the bargaining unit on the lines re
maining in Cleveland could not exceed 450.
Bluffing was not part of management©s strategy, nor did the union
ever suspect that it was. Local management had a certain "face validi
ty" because Phase 1 and Phase 2 had, in fact, been implemented with
the loss of over half of the jobs at the Cleveland plant. Hence, there
was no doubt among local union officials or the rank and file that Phase
3 was under consideration and would be implemented if economically
justified.
Interviews with union negotiators substantiated the fact that they believ
ed management©s report on the Phase 3 study. There had been a substan
tial turnover of plant management in the past five to six years, but the
plant manager who initiated the discussions had worked at the plant
for over four years in various capacities. He was respected by the local
union leadership and was believed to have considerable influence at the
corporate level.

Decision Process
After a discussion with union leadership, the plant manager and his
personnel director decided to undertake their own study of relative labor
costs and the potential for saving the plant in Cleveland. They feared
that if nothing were done prior to the release of the Phase 3 task force
report, corporate management would make a decision based on that
report without providing any opportunity for the local union in Cleveland
to respond. Although the manager and personnel director undertook
the study with the principal question being, "What will it take to save
the Cleveland plant," they also saw their effort as related to the overall
corporate objectives of maximizing profits. That is, if costs could be
reduced at the Cleveland plant, the alternative of saving it was actually
less expensive than moving to the South. Consequently, the corpora
tion as a whole would benefit from preserving the plant in Cleveland.
On the basis of their studies, the plant manager and personnel direc
tor determined that a labor cost saving of approximately $5.00/hour
would be necessary to retain the Cleveland facility. The local managers
realized that employees at the Cleveland plant would not accept a
$5.00/hour reduction in pay and benefits, even if it were necessary to
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save their jobs. The managers focused their attention on improving pro
ductivity, therefore, as a source of cost saving. Work rules which had
evolved in the plant over its long history afforded them a great
opportunity.
The local management team presented their views to corporate
managers and received approval to open negotiations with the union
in an effort to renegotiate the issues they had identified. These negotia
tions began in early January 1982. The parties faced a deadline of
February 15, when the corporate capital allocation committee would
decide whether to invest the necessary funds to make the move from
Cleveland to the South.
An important part of management©s strategy was to deal with union
leaders rather than to attempt to bypass them with an appeal to the rank
and file. In 1979, management had attempted to communicate directly
with rank-and-file employees in the hope they could influence
negotiators, but this technique was not successful at the bargaining table.
It led to a 10-week stoppage. Since the union©s leaders were firmly in
control of the local union, leader support for the management proposals
was a sine qua non for management©s obtaining the labor cost changes
necessary to forestall Phase 3.
At the initial meeting, the local management team presented the union
with comparative labor cost and, wage data. Comparisons were made
with the wages and fringe benefits of the two principal domestic com
petitors of the corporation. Management also presented information on
local Cleveland area wage surveys. The pattern of both sets of data show
ed that the employees in the corporation©s plant at Cleveland had the
best of all wage and benefit packages. Management asserted that if the
Cleveland plant were to close, the alternative employment opportunities
for union members were not appealing. Moreover, if wages and benefits
were to "stand still" for even a few years, the employees would not
be disadvantaged relative to others in their industry or occupations.
The union bargaining team, composed of local union representatives
with one international business agent, was prepared to hear a demand
for wage concessions. Instead, management proposed a reduction in
future wage increases (which had already been negotiated) and the
elimination of cost-of-living allowances. Management also proposed
the reduction of four paid holidays per year and a modification in paid
union time, an issue which had been critical in the 1979 negotiations.
For local management, the most important aspect of the proposal was
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a list of work rule changes aimed at improving labor productivity and
reducing labor costs through an increase in the "effort bargain." Specific
details were omitted, but a general outline of the areas to be considered
was laid on the table.
Following this first meeting, the union circulated the complete manage
ment proposal to the membership at the plant. In the opinion of local
management, the fact that the company had not requested a wage roll
back or significant benefit concessions strongly increased the likelihood
of an early settlement with substantial labor cost savings through work
rules modification.
Between January 6 and February 3, 1982, the company and the union
held 13 meetings to negotiate the changes proposed by the company.
On February 5 the union executive board voted 6 to 5 in favor of recom
mending the changes to the membership, and on February 11, 1982,
the membership voted 176 to 82 to ratify the agreement. The most essen
tial elements in this agreement from the company©s viewpoint were
modifications to work rules, flexibility in assignment, and the consolida
tion of job titles. The agreement to keep hourly labor costs constant
over the term of the agreement (44 months) was also important. Although
it was not part of the formal agreement, the company issued a "job
security letter" that stipulated that with the approval of the agreement,
the Phase 3 program would be "averted." The letter also guaranteed
that employees with a seniority date prior to 1962 (existing employees
currently active at work) would not be subject to layoff for the dura
tion of the agreement.
The modifications to work rules comprised 21 pages of reference to
contract clauses, side letters of agreement, and past practices that were
eliminated or substantially modified. The practices included rules con
cerning assignment, premium pay, and job title consolidation.

Contributing Factors
The Cleveland plant was the original production facility in the cor
poration and had served as corporate headquarters until the mid-1960s.
Many corporate executives had worked in the plant and in a sentimen
tal way viewed the plant as the heart of the corporation, despite the
fact that it no longer was. For that reason, proposals that could provide
a rational justification for retaining the facility were welcomed at cor
porate headquarters.
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As noted, there had been a substantial turnover in plant managers
within this plant over the seven years prior to 1981. The plant manager
in charge of the negotiations, however, had been employed at the plant
since 1976, so that he was known to the union leadership. Moreover,
he was thought to have substantial status within the corporate hier
archy and for that reason appeared to the union leaders to be able to
speak with authority in these negotiations.
The union constituency in the Cleveland plant has historically been
militant. The labor agreement never contained a clause for binding
grievance arbitration, so grievances could be resolved through midcontract strikes. These had occurred frequently at various times in the
history of the relationship between the parties. Over the decade prior
to 1982, however, union leaders and constituents had become less and
less militant; there were no strikes in the plant after 1970. There was
a 10-week lockout in 1979, when the company©s position was "no agree
ment, no work."
The general climate of industrial relations in the plant was positive
at the time of the interviews in 1982. The interpersonal relations be
tween the union and the plant manager and plant industrial relations
manager were good, although there had been some variation over the
years due to the considerable turnover in these positions. Unionmanagement meetings occurred on a regular basis, resulting in open
communication. From the point of view of the corporation, the Cleveland
plant historically had been the most militant in the truck component
division, but this pattern had not been so clear between 1972 and 1982.
There was complete plant-level control over negotiations on the
management side. On the union side, the international representative
was present for negotiations, but the settlement was completely in the
hands of local union leadership.

Final Outcome
Although the settlement agreement had achieved the efficiencies and
economies sought by management, the state of the truck components
markets served by this plant continued to decline throughout 1983. In
addition, one of the company©s domestic competitors came on line with
a new production facility in the South, which substantially eroded the
corporation©s market in that area. In early January 1983, the corpora
tion announced that it would have to reconsider the future of the
Cleveland plant. Corporate spokespeople attributed the situation to the
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continuing recession, increased competition, and the deregulation of
the trucking industry.
According to an article in the Cleveland Plain Dealer (January 12,
1983) management warned union officials about the potential for clos
ing and the officials "were told to present alternatives to the closings."
The corporation "did not say the Company was asking for concessions,
leaving that decision to the [union]." Shortly thereafter, the union
membership voted overwhelmingly to reject any further consideration
of concessions. News reports indicated that union leaders and members
felt betrayed. On January 27, 1983, the decision of the corporation to
close the facility was made public.

Inferences
A post hoc analysis of this case shows that the Cleveland plant was
the victim of the "tragedy scenario." The decision of the corporation
to expand production facilities and move production lines to the South
during the 1960s and 1970s clearly reduced the viability of the Cleveland
plant. The new product lines and production technologies were introduc
ed not in Cleveland, but in new plants in the South. When the economic
crisis of the early 1980s occurred, the volume of production could not
sustain all the plants the corporation had developed.
Moreover, the chairman of the corporation announced there were
several other corporate objectives that influenced his decision to close
the Cleveland facility to reduce the corporation©s involvement in truck
component production, to reposition the corporation toward higher
technology industries, and to free resources for alternative investments.
Under the circumstances, with a restructured market place, increased
competition, and reduced expectations for long-run rates of return, this
particular plant stood little chance of being saved.
In retrospect, too little was done too late. Only a remarkable economic
recovery with increased demand for truck components would have saved
this facility. Even then it is not clear that the long-term future for the
facility was very good. Only the introduction of new products at the
plant would have assured its long-term viability. Such a development
would have been unlikely in the face of the corporate chairman©s an
nounced policies and the continued ownership of the plant by the
corporation.
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Conclusions
As noted in the Introduction, one of the more popular explanations
for Cleveland©s loss of plants and jobs is the "poor labor climate"
high wages, restrictive work practices, and the belligerent nature of
its labor-management relations. 5 The three cases reviewed in this chapter
suggest that this is a simplistic explanation. Proposals to lower wages,
eliminate restrictive work practices and generally improve the "labor
climate" will not, by themselves, guarantee jobs.
Unfortunately, this is the message that is often conveyed, despite the
fact that the matter of job security is much more complex. In all three
cases reviewed here, management confirmed that wage and benefit costs
were not the immediate cause of plant shutdown, that restrictive work
practices had never been a problem or had recently been substantially
reduced, and that the labor climate had improved. Rather, it was the
change in the marketplace for products produced that led to closure.
On the other hand, the product market explanation for closure places
emphasis on the near term past. Such a short-run perspective what
could or could not have been done in the last six months is also decep
tive. A longer-run view suggests that some focus on the labor climate
may, indeed, be appropriate. In the first case, it is clear that the single
product design for the plant and the company©s reliance on that pro
duct to keep the Blue Water Seafood plant viable was a high risk strategy.
In Custom Lumber Products, the limited range of uses for the mill was
also a factor leading to its closure. In the third case, the continued nar
rowing of product lines produced in the Cleveland Truck Components
plant reduced the viability of that plant. The lesson for surviving
managers, employees, and unions is that pressure must continually be
applied to bring new products (and new technologies) into an existing
plant. To rely on any product very far into the future is unwise. The
marketing concept of finite "product life cycle" should be apparent.
A second lesson is that some margin for uncertainty should always
be present. It is not sufficient that a plant is breaking even or making
a small profit. Employees and their unions must ask several key ques
tions. (1) Are the profits of this plant so slim that a sudden unforeseen
jolt to factor costs, such as energy prices, could lead to red ink? (2) Is
this plant the high cost producer so that if a decline in product demand
occurs, it will be the first plant to close? If the answer to either of these
is affirmative, immediate steps should be taken to transform the plant
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either to produce its existing product more efficiently or to bring in
new products that will "broaden the portfolio" or add to profitability.
These three cases illustrate better than any others included in this study
that it is never too early to think about preserving plants and jobs. It
is not the intention of this study to argue that any plant can be saved
at any given point. Beyond some point, no rational economic action
can sustain a plant. The message is to encourage early recognition of
such a point before it is reached and to do something about it.
The next chapter illustrates cases where timely recognition did occur
and plants were saved. The most likely scenario for all four cases in
the next chapter is that all would have been closed had the parties not
acted to save them.
NOTES
1. Daniel A. Littman and Myung-Hoon Lee, "Plant Closings and Worker
Dislocation," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (Fall
1983).
2. Robert B. McKersie and William S. McKersie, Plant Closings: What Can
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Meeting, Labor Law Journal (August 1984) for a discussion of alternative
strategies in the U.S. and U.K.
3. The company, industry, and several key facts in this case have been disguised
to protect confidentiality.
4. The name of the company has been withheld at the request of management.
5. Cleveland Tomorrow A Strategy for Economic Vitality, Cleveland Tomor
row Committee, December 1981, pp. 5-6.
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Why Plants Are Saved
Decisions to reduce or to relocate business operations are
made in a competitive world with constantly shifting relative
advantages. These shifts include the level and location of de
mand for products; the kind and cost of transportation of raw
materials as well as finished products; the relative tax
burdens; the relative costs of inputs such as raw material,
labor and energy; [and] the competitive adrenalin level in
the company and the industry. ©
The preceding chapter has demonstrated that reduced profits and con
sequent plant closure can result for a variety of reasons and that the
labor climate can be a contributing factor even if it is not an immediate
cause.
If plants with a poor labor climate are to be saved, a substantial in
vestment in improved labor relations is necessary. This statement can
be interpreted in the psychological sense, i.e., that a strong personal
commitment to the process by both union leaders and management is
essential to its achievement. It can also be interpreted in a traditional
economic sense, particularly for management. Both time and intellec
tual resources are money. Such an investment in the labor climate must
be weighed against alternative uses such as closing the plant with the
poor labor climate and opening a new plant elsewhere.
The four plants in this chapter share the common characteristic that
all were threatened with closure, explicitly in three cases and implicit
ly in one, during the early 1980s, and all would probably be closed
now had there been no investment to improve the labor climate. At the
end of 1985, all plants were still in operation and all had higher levels
of employment than at the time of negotiations.
Cleveland Twist Drill
Until 1967, this Cleveland cutting tool plant served as headquarters
for an international, century-old, family-owned company. The com33
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pany has been the industry innovator for new cutting tools and produc
tion methods and has an international reputation for high quality. In
1967, the company merged with another Cleveland-based machine tool
company to form Acme-Cleveland. At first, the new parent corpora
tion exercised little direct influence on the plant©s philosophy and
operating style.
During the 1967-1981 period, profits for both the plant and the cor
poration fell dramatically. The union©s spokesman indicated that the
Cleveland facility was still in the black, but the crucial question was
whether the level of profits at the Cleveland plant was acceptable to
management and influential stockholders in the corporation. Produc
tivity in the Cleveland plant was high, but there were also relatively
high hourly wage and benefit costs. An incentive/profit sharing pro
gram, originally implemented at the plant in 1914, had produced an
average hourly wage rate of $12.50 with benefit costs of nearly $9.00
per hour (due in part to the high average age of the workforce). Thus
the plant had hourly labor costs of nearly $22.00 an hour, versus an
industry average of about $12.00.
Foreign competition was also a major element leading to lower pro
fits. According to the union spokesman, mass production of products
with somewhat lower quality had become possible through technological
innovation. Customers had begun to turn to these products rather than
pay the price for the high quality products produced by older technologies
in the Cleveland plant. Moreover, there had been considerable pressure
by foreign governments to require "off-set" production within their
countries or "domestic content" for imported products. Thus foreign
markets were lost.
Competition for the plant came as much from within the corporation
as from external sources. Prior to 1981, the company had opened several
new production facilities in North Carolina, Rhode Island and Kentucky.
None was unionized and all were newer facilities than the Cleveland
plant (portions of which were built in the 1880s). Although new pro
duction equipment had been developed and introduced in the Cleveland
plant within the past 10 years, some of it had been moved to the plant
in North Carolina. The company was in a position to move production
out of Cleveland and into one of the unorganized plants without a ma
jor disruption.
In 1981, a new chief executive officer was appointed by the board.
The paternalism which had been characteristic of the company in prior
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years was virtually eliminated by this new CEO. He and his newly ap
pointed subordinate at the plant began to institute immediate changes.
Major personnel cuts were made among salaried and white-collar
employees. According to the personnel director, about half of the
managerial workforce at the plant was in total shock. The other half
welcomed the changes as necessary for company survival with com
ments like, "It is about time." Union-management relations also changed
dramatically. The independent union, which had organized in the 1930s
with the tacit approval of the family-owners, found itself playing a com
pletely new game.
Employment levels in the plant had reflected economic conditions
over the past 10 years, as well as the movement of production to other
plants. In 1967, employment peaked at 1300 bargaining unit employees;
after operating at lower levels throughout most of the 1970s, a peak
employment of 1050 was reached in 1979. From this point there was
a steady decline until June 1982, when employment was approximate
ly 550. At that time, the first vote on concessions failed to carry, and
the company immediately moved about half the production out of the
Cleveland plant.
Employer Decision
The employer©s position was that in order to continue producing cut
ting tools in the Cleveland plant, redesign of the production facility with
considerable investment would be necessary. These changes would not
be made, however, if labor costs were to remain high and if labor was
not going to be flexible with regard to retraining and reassignment. It
was in this context that a seniority grievance arose and that the employer
initiated informal discussions concerning concessions in the spring of
1982. The CEO©s position was that unless substantial concessions were
made and other changes implemented in the plant, he would relocate
production to other plants where the necessary changes could be made.
Union Awareness
When the austerity programs were applied to the salaried employees,
rank-and-file union members began to sense that top management©s at
tention would eventually turn to them as well. Most of the salaried
employee adjustments took place toward the end of 1981, so that by
early 1982, the employees in the bargaining unit were anticipating the
discussions which followed.
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With the actions of the corporation in the winter of 1981-82, the
strategy of the new CEO was becoming clearer. From the union
spokesman©s perspective, the CEO©s objective was to decentralize pro
duction by installing new production equipment in other locations rather
than in Cleveland so that the corporation would gain leverage to deal
with the union and have an alternative if negotiations failed. Initial discus
sions were held with members of the union bargaining committee to
tell them about problems at the plant. In April 1982, there were meetings
with groups of employees on an informal basis. According to the per
sonnel director, the bargaining committee for the union accurately com
municated to the employees what it was hearing from management. In
general, the committee members laid out the details factually and without
distortion. Despite the reality of the cutbacks that had already been im
plemented at the plant, and despite the existence of the company©s other
facilities, neither the bargaining committee nor the employees believ
ed that the corporation would actually close the Cleveland plant. The
lack of credibility was partly due (1) to the employees© belief that they
were essential and irreplaceable, (2) to their lack of familiarity with
the marketplace, and (3) to the sudden change in management style and
approach.
Decision Process
In late April 1982, the parties began negotiations. Although the con
tract still had 18 months to run, the company demanded a new 43-month
contract containing wage and benefit cuts amounting to at least $4.00
an hour, according to one newspaper report. The concessions included
a 31-month wage freeze, an end to the cost-of-living allowance, cuts
in incentive pay, elimination of four paid holidays, reduced vacations,
and replacement of a 68-year-old profit-sharing plan with a 50 percent
matching savings plan for workers. According to the union president,
in some cases the wage and incentive pay cuts could have reduced a
worker©s wages by more than $8.00 per hour. At the time these demands
were made in April 1982, the union president was told that the com
pany regarded its proposals on wages and benefits to be nonnegotiable.
Included on the management bargaining team was a new vice-president
who had recently been hired away from another Cleveland company.
In his previous job, he had been a key figure in a lengthy strike after
which the union lost its certification. In the initial sessions with the union
at the plant, this individual was quoted by the personnel director as having
said, "I©m here to do a job. If I need to move the work out, I will."
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This attitude and the company©s rigid position alienated the union and
created animosity in the first meeting. There was no movement on the
part of either party.
The union finally took the company©s proposals to the membership
for a vote in June. Prior to the vote, the company had mailed a letter
to employees stating, "If the package is rejected: (1) Our costs will
be too high to make most tools in Cleveland; (2) The significant amount
of money that could have been spent in Cleveland is likely to be spent
elsewhere to make the company competitive." The union viewed this
letter as either a threat or a bluff. In either case, the membership was
inclined to "show the company" and the proposal failed 19-507.
Well after the 1982 negotiations, the union president acknowledged
that the economics of the cutting tool market had actually driven those
negotiations. He was aware of the market conditions, although his
membership was not as well-informed. It is clear now, however, that
the personal animosity that had developed during negotiations served
only to exacerbate the difficult bargaining that was necessary. In
retrospect, the personnel manager felt that the company pushed too fast
and had too little credibility with the workforce. Despite what had hap
pened in the salaried ranks, many of the employees simply refused to
believe that the corporation could close the Cleveland plant complete
ly. Another factor was that the union leadership and its constituency
were in step with each other. Management misunderstood this unity
prior to the first-round vote.
Union leaders and members were not convinced prior to the election
that the corporation would close down its Cleveland operations. On the
other hand, they did sense that some changes were needed and that future
investment in the plant might be affected if such changes were not made.
According to a newspaper report, after the first election, the union re
quested that the company again enter negotiations with the union con
cerning company needs.
Management agreed to meet but stated that the company was "disap
pointed with the results of the vote, and won©t be investing the type
of money in the facility we would have otherwise." 2 It implemented
a plan to expand production elsewhere by purchasing a vacant warehouse
in North Carolina in September 1982. Modifications were made in that
facility, and by December 1982, first production was coming out of
that plant. About half of the production capacity in the Cleveland plant
was relocated to North Carolina. As a result, nearly half of the jobs
in the Cleveland plant were eliminated.
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What might be characterized as stage two of the decision process in
volved a seniority grievance. As a result of the company©s 1981 modifica
tions to the production process, particularly the realignment from pro
cess orientation to product line orientation in the plant, a seniority
grievance had been filed by the union. It involved a conflict between
departmental and plantwide seniority. The company©s position was that
the old seniority provision was no longer applicable or feasible because
of the realignment of production in the plant. The company offered to
work out alternative plans with the union, but the union forced the matter
to arbitration. Although the union president was certain that he would
win in arbitration, the arbitrator ultimately ruled in the company©s favor
with a decision that came back to the parties in August 1982.
About that time, union leaders contacted Mayor Voinovich of the City
of Cleveland and asked him to look into the potential job loss associated
with the company©s purchase of the North Carolina warehouse. After
some investigation, the mayor apparently responded to the union through
his chief economic advisor that the company was indeed serious about
moving out of Cleveland completely unless the union made concessions.
The mayor had also been convinced that the company had a valid
argument.
The mayor©s message, the results of the spring negotiations, the ar
bitrator decision, and the plan to move equipment to the new North
Carolina location convinced the union president that new discussions
with the company were critical. At the same time, the personnel manager
recognized that although the union had indicated a willingness to discuss
the company©s needs further, the union president was reluctant to push
for such negotiations because such a move would signal weakness on
the part of the union to the company. A mediator from the Federal Media
tion and Conciliation Service office in Cleveland offered to help in
itiate discussions and both parties responded positively.
The second round of negotiations was conducted with a total news
blackout. In the earlier negotiations, stories had appeared in the
Cleveland newspapers after every negotiating session. This publicity
had served to undermine the positions of both bargaining teams, but
particularly that of the union team. The company negotiating team for
the second round also excluded the abrasive vice-president. A more con
ciliatory team that included an attorney, the plant manager and the plant
industrial relations manager represented the company. Finally, in light
of the experience with the first vote, the company did not send letters
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to the homes of members or attempt any direct communication. It was
clear that the union leadership could communicate accurately and ef
fectively with the constituency and that it reflected the constituency©s
views. Consequently, the company had to rely on these leaders© ability
to convince the constituency to vote for the concessions which were
ultimately agreed upon after the second round of negotiations.
In the view of the plant personnel manager, the turning point in
negotiations came subsequent to the union©s filing of an unfair labor
practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board about
Thanksgiving 1982. Until that time, little progress had been made in
negotiations. The company offered a conciliatory gesture at the time
of the filing, and within two weeks the union had withdrawn the ULP
charge. Subsequent to that time, a total of 15 meetings were held with
the federal mediator through April 1983. Both parties agreed that the
mediator was extremely effective in getting the message across to the
union concerning the reality of the company©s intentions. The mediator
was a former union president. This gave him the credibility to persuade
the union committee that concessions were absolutely critical. Union
members ratified the concessions 141-86.
From the company©s point of view, crucial changes in the agreement
included a reduction in average labor costs for the plant. The average
wage rate was reduced by $3.00 per hour with wages frozen for the
duration of the contract. The cost-of-living allowance was also
eliminated. Other significant factors for the company were the reduc
tion of the number of job descriptions and labor grades and a modifica
tion of the seniority provision in the contract. The union not only ac
cepted the new provisions in the contract, but also agreed that it would
not institute any form of legal action through the NLRB or the courts
with respect to the company©s previous relocation or consolidation of
operations.
In return for the changes in the agreement, the company agreed not
to transfer the manufacture of existing product lines to any company
facility except those specifically identified in the company proposal that
was ratified by the union.
Contributing Factors
The change in management as well as in management style immediate
ly prior to the company©s demand for negotiations and concessions was
a significant factor blocking credibility. Moreover, the style of the vice-
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president and his reputation concerning his previous antiunion activities
(whether deserved or not) were significant factors leading to animosity
in the initial round of bargaining with the union.
It could be argued that the new aggressive style of management was
crucial in order to save the plant. Had the austerity programs not been
implemented at that time, it is problematic whether the plant could have
survived. At the same time, there is no question that the autocratic ag
gressive approach of some of the new management team interfered with
effective communications and motivated negative union responses.
The union in this case was not particularly militant, nor had it ever
had any difficulty negotiating agreements with the paternalistic-style
management of the old company. One could argue that since the union
members had received the best in benefits and wages, there was no reason
for militancy. At the same time, however, the tradition of militancy
and resistance to management initiatives did not exist in this particular
case. Instead, this attitude appears to have arisen in response to the style
of management which was suddenly imposed in the situation.
It is also apparent that the union leadership was both responsive to,
and able to lead, its constituency. The potential for union politics to
disrupt bargaining and prevent or block realistic negotiations does not
seem to have been a significant problem in this case.
Negotiations and ratification were entirely within the control of the
local union president and his constituency. On the management side,
details of negotiations were clearly in the hands of plant management,
although the CEO of the corporation had an interest in the outcome
and the total cost of production in Cleveland. Local plant-level control
was important in providing the flexibility and rapid turnaround in posture
for both parties that was essential for saving the plant.

Final Outcome
As part of their agreement, the parties negotiated a new productivity
gain-sharing incentive program to be implemented in April 1984.
Although it was somewhat delayed, that program was adopted and put
into effect as of September 1, 1984. The long-term prognosis for this
plant is uncertain. Labor costs are still well above industry average,
and the physical facilities in Cleveland are not conducive to the most
efficient production configuration. In early 1985, however, the personnel
manager informed researchers that one production line that had previous-
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ly been moved to North Carolina had been returned to Cleveland, and
that employment was up.
On September 1, 1986, Crain ©s Cleveland Business reported the com
pany had moved its Cynthiana, Kentucky plant production to Cleveland.
Under a new agreement with the union, employees who filled the "Ken
tucky jobs" would be paid less than the rate for other jobs in the plant.
Over 100 new positions were created in Cleveland by the move.
Inferences
This case illustrates as well as any in the study the impact that changing
markets have on traditional, staid bargaining relationships. Manage
ment is always first to recognize the need for change. The case also
illustrates that change may be more difficult to achieve with new
(unknown) management.
Credibility was a crucial issue here, as was the style of management
in the negotiations. Even with hard evidence concerning wage rates and
the competitive position of the plant, the union was not prepared to ac
cept management statements concerning the potential for closing the
plant. Even more compelling was the fact that substantial austerity pro
grams had already been implemented with the termination of nearly half
of the white-collar/supervisory workforce at the plant.
The purchase of the plant in North Carolina, the loss of an arbitra
tion decision concerning seniority, the contact with the Mayor and his
associates, the introduction of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service mediator into the situation helped overcome the credibility
problem.
A key question is whether the company©s purchase of the warehouse
in North Carolina and its subsequent move of over half of the plant©s
jobs to North Carolina was necessary for the union©s recognition of reali
ty. That position is certainly arguable. On the other hand, it may be
that a more tolerant and patient personal style by management during
the first round of negotiations might have permitted the corporation to
avoid the expense associated with this move to North Carolina.

Ohio Rubber
The similarities between Cleveland Twist Drill and Ohio Rubber are
substantial. Both began as family-owned firms in what are now old
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facilities. Both were bought by or merged into larger companies in the
recent past. The parent companies established alternative manufactur
ing facilities so that there was potential for a "tragedy scenario." The
companies© needs for concessions to keep the plants competitive were
strong enough to evoke bonafide closure threats at the time of negotia
tions. Finally, credibility played a role in the pace of negotiations and
nearly led to plant closure.
A family-owned rubber company built the original part of Ohio Rubber
over 100 years ago in a Cleveland suburb. The plant produces molded
rubber products mainly for the auto industry "everything that©s made
from rubber except the tires." In 1952, the company was purchased
by a conglomerate from outside the Cleveland area. There has been
essentially no change in the product mix or markets for the firm©s pro
ducts since the 1950s. A very large proportion of the plant©s output
is sold to one major auto manufacturer, and this arrangement has a
substantial impact on products produced, quality control and the level
of activity at the plant. If this major customer were lost, the plant would
inevitably close.
Bargaining unit employment at the plant reached nearly 1000 in the
middle 1970s. By late 1982, however, the number of employees had
fallen to 375. Subsequent to the negotiation that saved the plant in January
1983, employment grew to slightly over 500.
The profitability of the plant is highly dependent on volume. The slump
in auto sales during the 1982 recession substantially affected the per
formance of the plant. By late 1982, this plant was losing nearly $600,000
per month.
Despite the efforts of the company to introduce rubber industrial pro
ducts that are highly specialized and engineered to meet customer
specification, these new products do not account for a substantial amount
of business at the plant. The corporation recently purchased another
rubber products manufacturer, closed its principal manufacturing facility,
and integrated some of its operations into the Cleveland plant in order
to boost volume.
The source of competition that led to the plant closing threat in
Cleveland was the other company locations rather than external or foreign
competition. These other locations were much smaller facilities with
smaller optimal operating levels. They also had lower labor costs and
in two cases were nonunionized.
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Employer Decision
The proximate cause of the crisis for the Cleveland plant was the 1982
recession. The corporation©s policies concerning the development of
smaller new plants in Pennsylvania and Indiana, as well as its purchase
of another rubber products company in the early 1980s, contributed
to this plant©s difficulties, however. In late 1982, the company©s prin
cipal production facility was the Cleveland plant, but specialized pro
ducts were being produced in its smaller plants in Tennessee, Illinois,
Texas, Indiana and Pennsylvania. The Texas and Indiana plants had
been established during the 1970s as satellite plants for the Cleveland
operation because volume was so large at that time.
In early 1982, the company©s principal customer in the auto industry
demanded that prices be reduced. This compounded the difficulty for
the company. The customer was demanding long-term contracts from
the company at progressively lower prices.
Despite the fact that the principal production plant for an acquired
rubber products company had been closed in 1981 (following a long
strike), there was still a need to consolidate operations to achieve
economies of scale and improve the overall cost picture. The parent
corporation was fully aware of the cyclical nature of the automotive
rubber supply industry and has traditionally covered the Cleveland plant©s
losses for brief periods. The size of the plant©s monthly loss, and the
continuation of these losses for an extended period of time, could not
be tolerated, however. Corporate management©s principal concern was
reducing cost. It did not prescribe the method for achieving cost reduc
tion, but left the solution in the hands of the rubber company.
The choice facing the company was not whether to close facilities,
but which of its facilities to close. Management realized that Cleveland
was a desirable location to maintain because the plant there was the
only completely integrated facility. Moreover, it was close to the market
for its products. Finally, some of top management identified with the
plant since they had begun their careers there and they felt an obliga
tion to long-service employees at the Cleveland plant. Labor and utili
ty costs were higher in Cleveland, however, and management could
not justify the maintenance of the Cleveland facility while other lower
cost production facilities were readily available to the company in its
satellite locations.
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One other important element was the company©s need to modernize
its production facilities. New technology for the production of floor
mats was available to the company. By 1983, management had to make
a decision on where these facilities would be located. In effect, the
negotiations in late 1982 and early 1983 concerned the location of these
new mat production facilities.
Union Awareness
The company had utilized news bulletins to keep its employees in
formed concerning conditions at the plant both good and bad. The union
had always been advised about plans for new product lines and redevelop
ment in the plant. As a result, according to one management spokesper
son, the employees were less skeptical concerning conditions in late
1982 than they might have been in a more tightly controlled environment.
Shortly after the corporation had made it clear that it would no longer
absorb the extraordinary losses of the rubber company, the vice-president
in charge of labor relations approached the union president requesting
that the rubber workers© union open contract negotiations early. The
contract then in effect was not due to expire until January 1984. On
November 4, 1982, a letter went to the union president stating that the
company was going to close plants and explaining that the 1981-84 con
tract terms had been agreed to with the expectation that business would
support them. In addition, the company asserted that it was impossible
to meet the demands by the principal customer of the company for multi
ple year contracts with price reductions and fulfill the terms of the
1981-1984 labor contract. Finally, the letter made it clear that unless
the losses of the Cleveland plant were reduced, the corporation would
act to close it. The letter went on to summarize the changes in labor
costs that the company wanted to implement. This letter clearly spell
ed out the company©s objectives and needs, as well as the alternatives
if these needs were not met.
The union president was convinced that the contentions in the letter
were essentially true and that some sort of labor cost modification would
be necessary. He was aware that the company had previously closed
one of its plants in South Carolina. He was also aware that a plant owned
by another company, a competitor, had been closed. His comment during
one interview was that the economic conditions of the industry were
"a known fact." Nonetheless, there remained some skepticism con
cerning the need for the degree of contract modification sought by the
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company. Among both the rank and file and some elected officials, there
was resistance to the proposals put forth by the company to reduce labor
costs.
Decision Process
On the recommendation of the president of the rubber company, a
general meeting for all hourly and salaried employees was called to ex
plain the company dilemma and what it would take to keep the plant
operating. Although adjustments in salaried employee conditions were
necessary, the future of the plant depended on the acceptance of con
tract adjustments by unionized hourly employees. A corporate executive
vice-president who had formerly served as president of the Rubber Com
pany and had been associated with the plant for many years conducted
the meeting. During the early part of November, the parties met and
reached a tentative agreement which would have cut fifty cents per hour
from labor costs at the plant. Most of these savings were prospective.
They involved no immediate cuts in wages or benefits for employees.
The membership of the local, however, was not persuaded that con
cessions were necessary and refused to ratify the proposal.
Shortly after the membership meeting, the company determined that
the proposed concession package was not nearly enough to save the
plant. In fact, it had concluded that labor cost reductions for the future
would have to be closer to $2.00 per hour in order to justify maintain
ing the Cleveland facility. The parties resumed negotiations without much
optimism.
After intensive negotiations in early December, the union committee
agreed to call another membership meeting for Sunday, December 12.
Management submitted a complete proposal to the union committee on
Friday, December 10, expecting the proposal to be discussed and
possibly ratified at the union meeting Sunday. In return for concessions
amounting to about $1.50 per hour, management offered to close its
Tennessee plant and move its operations, and about 20 jobs, to
Cleveland. Management also offered to place its new floor mat pro
cess in Cleveland and keep it there for the term of the agreement. The
concessions did not require any employee to take a cut in current wages.
At the Friday meeting, the union brought up a matter concerning work
assignment in particular, an attempt by a supervisor to assign the task
of cleaning a rest room to an employee not regularly assigned to such
tasks. The union demanded assurances that no such assignments could
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be made in the future, and when such an assurance was not forthcom
ing they walked out of the meeting and cancelled the scheduled Sunday
union meeting.
It was suggested by one interviewee that the real reason for the union©s
refusal to submit the package of company proposals to the union meeting
was political. The incumbent local president had called the December
12 meeting anticipating there would be general support from the union
negotiating committee for the package. When the committee decided
to make no recommendations, he was fearful that he would be the sole
union representative identified with concessions. In the meantime, a
formal local president, who had been defeated for reelection by the in
cumbent, had become the informal leader of the "stop concessions"
group. It was hypothesized that the only way the incumbent could get
away from his exposed position was to cancel the meeting.
The response of the company president was to write a letter to all
employees outlining the preceding events and offers by the company.
His letter noted the cancellation of the meeting, called attention to the
excuse for cancelling it, and stated the consequences that would surely
follow.
We were informed this morning, Saturday, December 11,
that the Committee would not submit the proposal to the
membership, and that Sunday©s membership meeting was be
ing called off.
We were told by the Committee that they were absolutely
unwilling to review the proposals until the Company agreed
that no ... employee whose job is done could be asked to
clean a restroom even if it is voluntary to finish out a day©s
work instead of being sent home without pay . . . This issue
could have easily been resolved in a normal grievance
meeting, if a grievance had been filed. It had no place in
such an important negotiation session except as either a
pressure tactic by the Union Committee or a technique
employed by the Union to avoid the real subject. We find
it incomprehensible that such an issue would lead to the com
plete breakdown of our talks and, therefore, place all our
jobs in jeopardy.
We have tried our best and have obviously failed to convey
to the Union Negotiating Committee the drastic consequences
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which will result from the failure to negotiate reductions.
We obviously must now make our future plans for produc
tion elsewhere at the earliest possible date.
The company issued a press release which included the letter it cir
culated to its employees. On Sunday, December 12, 1982, the Cleveland
Plain Dealer featured a story in which it stated that the plant would
be closed and the production would be moved out of the Cleveland area.
A Cleveland TV station also presented a synopsis of the situation, in
terviewing both company and union spokesmen.
A management spokesman stated that since the plant is not in
downtown Cleveland, but in a fringe suburb, it is seen by the community
as "its plant." Moreover, its location has allowed its workforce to live
in a concentrated group rather than be spread all over the metropolitan
area. Naturally, they are part of the community and the possibility for
interaction with other citizens in the community is great. This factor
was recognized by the company and it concluded that if the community
as a whole could be convinced of the company©s problems and its sinceri
ty concerning the closing threat, the community would be an ally in
their effort to retain the facility.
Although no hard evidence of the community©s role was available,
the company was convinced that its public relations effort did have an
impact. As a result of the publicity surrounding the cancellation of the
meeting, considerable pressure was mounted in the community. Many
members informally urged the union committee to do something, and
negotiations with the company were resumed about a week later. After
negotiating from mid-December through the early part of January, the
parties had reached agreement on a number of contract modifications,
but not on all issues raised by the company. The union committee agreed
to take the agreed-upon items, and company proposals on the remain
ing issues, to a membership vote, but without a formal recommenda
tion by the union committee. The membership of the local voted 178
to 125 to approve all contract modifications including company
proposals.
The new agreement provided for reduced vacations and holidays, a
modified health plan, and the elimination of a scheduled wage increase
for 1983. The company©s position throughout negotiations was that if
the union could determine alternative ways to reduce labor costs that
would be politically acceptable, the company would consider them. For
management, the goal had been to reduce labor costs by $2.00 per hour,
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but it was willing to allow for cost increases, subsequent to that cut,
provided the volume in the Cleveland plant rose. Wage increases dur
ing the term of the new three-year agreement were provided contingent
on volume in the plant.
The turning point in negotiations for the union president concerned
the guarantee of new production facilities in the Cleveland plant. He
wanted assurances that the company would invest in the new mat pro
cessing line in Cleveland and that it would not produce this product
elsewhere during the term of the agreement. It is clear from the events
described above, however, that even after these assurances, which were
contained in the company president©s letter of December 11, the political
situation within the bargaining unit had to be resolved before the set
tlement could be finalized.
Contributing Factors
The different personal styles of key management actors at different
stages in the decision process are apparent. During the first round of
talks with the union in November 1982, the corporation sent the cor
porate vice-president of labor relations to Cleveland for negotiations.
He was characterized by one spokesperson as a "young guy" who had
a negative impact. Union negotiators and local union members were
concerned about the capacity of such an individual to understand and
empathize with their position. They felt that he was more likely to "hit
and run." This individual was compared, perhaps unfairly, with a cor
porate negotiator who had, from the union©s point of view, forced the
union to the point of a strike in 1973. The employees were repelled
by this company negotiator and he was unable to make any headway
with the union concerning contract revisions.
Two key individuals for management stand out as having had a positive
impact. Their credibility was substantial and the success of negotiations
was primarily due to the role of these men. The first of these managers,
the local vice-president of employee relations for the rubber company,
had been with the company for 13 years in his present position. As a
result, the union and employees were confident that he had as much
at stake in these negotiations as they did. Another key player was an
executive vice-president for the parent corporation who had long tenure
in the Cleveland plant before he was promoted into the parent corpora
tion. Even though he was no longer physically located in Cleveland,
the union and the employees trusted his assertions during these
negotiations.
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Perhaps one of the most critical ingredients in this case was the pa
tience and enduring energy of management negotiators to "stick with
it." Others may have lost interest much earlier or would have been in
tolerant of union political considerations. On this dimension, Ohio Rub
ber contrasts sharply with Cleveland Twist Drill in its stage one
negotiations.
On the union side, the president of the local had been elected to that
position in October 1980, defeating the incumbent. The new president
favored negotiating with the company to develop a package that would
give employees the greatest assurance of job security with the least
sacrifice in terms and conditions. The former president, on the other
hand, opposed any renegotiation and led a sizeable minority faction
within the local on this issue. His influence was perhaps the principal
impediment to an early resolution of the negotiations at the plant.
It is interesting to speculate about the role of economic conditions
as they might have affected the political choices of the rank and file
in this case. By 1980, the industry had already begun to suffer economic
reverses and employees were aware of that. There was a lengthy strike
followed by the complete closure of the other major employer in the
community about that time. That closure added credibility to the
statements by Ohio Rubber that the Willoughby Plant could close.
Though it is speculative at best, such circumstances may have had a
bearing on the voters© choice of the less militant of two individuals for
a key negotiating role.
Three months after the new agreement had been signed, in May 1983,
there was a local union election for district delegate to the national union.
This office is frequently held by the president but not necessarily so.
The president won election as the district delegate over opposition from
the former president, with a margin of victory greater than the 178 to
125 vote on the contract renegotiation package in January. He viewed
this outcome as a vote of confidence for him and his renegotiation of
the agreement.
As a postscript, by September 1984, the local union president had
resigned to accept a staff position with the international union. He was
replaced in office by the more militant former president. The introduc
tion of new products at the plant coupled with a modest improvement
in economic conditions may have had a bearing. The impact of this
development on the future of the union-management relationship and
company plans at the Cleveland plant is unclear at this point. The new
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president promised to win back all the previous concessions. This turn
of events may have some impact on the prognosis for the plant.
Another element that helps explain the successful resolution of negotia
tions in this case is the history of union-management relations. Ohio
Rubber, like Cleveland Twist Drill, has had a long history of bargain
ing with few major work stoppages, the last one in 1963, and low
grievance rates. Only two or three grievances have reached arbitration
within the past fifteen years. From July 1982 through June 1983,
however, five grievances went to arbitration. These related primarily
to the new incentive system installed by management. In the opinion
of one union spokesman, the company vice-president of employee rela
tions had been accused by top management at the corporation of "giv
ing the plant away to the union." For that reason, he forced some of
the grievances into arbitration in order to have the arbitrator "take him
off the hook."
Union spokespeople expressed the view that interpersonal relations
between the union and management at the Cleveland plant were excellent.
Even with the introduction of new management people who were mov
ed to Cleveland as a result of corporate consolidation, the relations be
tween the union and managers have been good.
Part of the explanation for this harmony is the frequency of meetings
between the union and management. Every two to three weeks a
grievance meeting is held to review any matters at the second and third
steps. As a result of these meetings, management and the union presi
dent regularly see each other and discuss virtually any issue that either
wishes to raise during these meetings. On these occasions, management
takes the opportunity to discuss problems or plans with the union so
that there are virtually no surprises for the union president when moves
are made on the management side.
The only reservation the union reported concerning management was
the lack of involvement for employees with productivity problems in
the plant. Employees have not been invited to participate in the broader
issues of improving productivity. The union president feels that con
tributions could be made in this area.
Another element of similarity between Ohio Rubber and Cleveland
Twist Drill is the degree of autonomy held by local negotiators on both
sides. Corporate management imposed the requirement that local
management reduce labor costs or move production to one of its alter
native facilities. Details were left to local management. There was a
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substantial degree of overlap between corporate management and local
management in this particular case, both formally and informally. As
noted previously, the executive vice-president for the corporation was
the former president of this division. His length of service and involve
ment in prior operations at this plant enabled him to exercise considerable
influence without alienating existing management at the local level.
Moreover, his involvement was not viewed as an intrusion but rather
one of genuine interest and concern, since he had played a major role
in the development of the plant.

Final Outcome
The agreement reached in January 1983 provided for a 36-month con
tract. Union members agreed to give up a scheduled 40 cent per hour
wage increase under the cost-of-living plan and four cents in fringe
benefits scheduled to begin in January. There was no cut in current
wages, however. Employees also agreed to reduce holidays from 12
to 10 per year and to eliminate one week of vacation benefits for anyone
eligible to receive more than one week. Group health insurance costs
were reduced for the company through an increase in deductible amounts
to be assumed by employees.
During the 36-month contract, the company agreed to wage increases
based on a productivity formula and output measure. The latter was
dependent on the number of pounds of rubber processed in the plant.
A final contractual condition related to seniority for layoffs. The pro
vision allowed seniority to be calculated on a departmental or divisional
basis rather than plantwide for layoffs of up to two weeks. Finally, a
scheduled increase in the pension contributions was deleted.
With respect to the productivity program negotiated in the agreement,
there was some problem with implementation. The company has been
attempting to revamp the incentive plan, but so far there has been
resistance to the changes it has made. Obviously, to the extent that labor
costs are affected, plant retention remains an issue.
For its part, the company agreed to three major provisions in a letter
to the union dated January 3, 1983. Provided that the proposals negotiated
by the company and the union were ratified, the company agreed to
the following conditions:
1. The operations and the business of the company at its Tennessee
plant would be moved to the Cleveland plant. Such a move was to be
completed within three months of the effective date of the contract.
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2. The new floor mat operation would be developed and retained 100
percent in the Cleveland plant and no such mat production would be
maintained by the company at any location other than the Cleveland
plant through the expiration date of the contract.
3. Benefit reductions and wage restraints effective with this agree
ment would be applicable to all employees in the Cleveland plant and
not only to the hourly-rated employees.

Inferences
Management enjoyed a high level of credibility with union leader
ship and a substantial part of its constituency going into these negotia
tions. This was true with respect to both the company©s threat to close
as well as commitments it was willing to make provided the union
could agree to modified contract terms. In the early 1980s, the com
pany had already closed one of its nonunion facilities in the south and,
following a lengthy strike, had closed a major production facility in
another location in order to consolidate operations in Cleveland. In 1981,
when the union agreed to broader job classifications and definitions for
the involved work, the company agreed to transfer its wiper blade
manufacturing operations to Cleveland, thus enhancing job opportuni
ty locally. These operations had been moved and established in the
Cleveland plant about six months before the plant-saving negotiations
which are recounted here.
Union politics obviously played a critical role in the pace of these
negotiations. In the context of most of the other cases included in this
study, these politics would have caused failure and plant closure. Only
the incredible patience of management to try "one more round" of
negotiations led to success under adverse circumstances.
Management demonstrated so much patience that a cursory review
of this case might lead one to conclude its threat to close was, in fact,
a bluff. However, the size of the losses at the Cleveland plant and the
realistic alternatives management had for the location of its mat pro
duction and other existing lines indicate that management was not
bluffing.
Perhaps most important along this dimension was the experience of
the local vice-president of employee relations in dealing with this local
union. Management "knew" it could get the settlement with time. The
critical deadline that eventually led to settlement was the scheduled
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January 1983 wage increase and cost-of-living adjustment. They could
not be paid and everyone knew it. As with most negotiations, deadlines
are important to bring the process to conclusion.

Auto Parts3
The third and fourth plants in this chapter are parts of very large
multinational corporations not based in Cleveland. Both plants were
characterized by management personnel as among the worst in their
respective corporations in terms of labor climate in the mid-1970s. They
represent, perhaps, the quintessential examples of plants that have been
saved by a reversal of the labor climate.
Auto Parts, which is owned by one of the "big three" auto com
panies, produces components which are shipped to an assembly plant
by the corporation. A number of other plants owned by the corpora
tion produce essentially similar products. The Cleveland plant, built
in 1954, is neither the oldest nor the largest plant of its kind in the cor
poration, although it does occupy a crucial place in the production of
certain parts for the company. The product mix at the plant has not
changed substantially since the plant was opened. Employment levels
at the plant have ranged from a high of 3500 employees in the mid-1960s
to a low of about 1650 employees in 1980.
The attitude of top management in Detroit toward this particular plant
is important. Unlike the first two plants in this chapter, where top
management at the corporate level was positively biased due to sen
timental attachment or other reasons, in this situation top management
had the opposite bias. Conditions leading to these top management at
titudes toward the plant remained unchanged throughout most of the
1970s. Historically, the plant was viewed by many managers in the cor
poration as "unmanageable." Few mid-level or upper-level managers
in the corporation looked forward to an assignment at this plant.
In large measure this attitude developed out of the very negative labor
climate at the plant. In the 1960s, the environment was extremely hostile.
The union knew that the plant was crucial to the overall production net
work of the company and that a shutdown would cripple the ability of
the corporation to produce its automobiles. In the words of one inter
viewee, the strategy of the union was to increase the number of
employees in the plant by any means possible. Work rules were crafted
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in such a way as to maximize the use of employees in the plant. During
that era, it appeared that the union©s objective was to maximize the
amount of nonwork time paid for by the company.
Production standards and their interpretation were a major source of
the manageability problem, poor performance, and high labor costs in
this plant. The standards were set on the basis of normal operations.
Ordinarily, employees were permitted to cease work (and some went
home) when standards were met. Other plants typically work "bell-tobell," that is, they produce above standard on many days because they
do not stop work when the standard is met.
Even more critical was the accounting method for down time. When
mechanical breakdowns occurred, employees were credited for output
as though the plant were operating normally. Thus there was little in
centive for employee action to keep the plant running smoothly. The
"phantom parts" that were never produced naturally increased the dif
ficulty of managing the plant and added to the real per unit labor costs
in the plant.
Although other corporate plants have developed work practices that
undermine higher productivity, such practices were rarely written and
were not uniformly enforced. For example, at the company©s largest
plant producing similar products, some of the practices were the same
as at the Cleveland plant, but the local union became flexible on the
maintenance of these practices during the late 1970s, since the need
for increased production and profitability had become apparent. At the
Cleveland plant, however, the rules have all been put into writing so
that the local agreement is nearly as thick as the master agreement be
tween the international union and the corporation. Moreover, the local
has never made any concessions to improve the picture for manage
ment and has never felt that the members had any direct stake in im
proving the performance of the plant.
With respect to investment and technological change, the union at
this plant fought the introduction of both radio-controlled cranes and
automated material-handling transport. Although the union©s concern
for job security is understandable, these investments were crucial to
keeping the plant competitive with other corporation plants. Only after
1980 did some portion of the union©s leadership come to realize that
if these and similar investments were not made and accepted by the ex
isting workforce, all of the members would be out of work.
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The management spokesman made one further important point con
cerning investment in this particular plant. He indicated that although
the company had undertaken investment in new production lines, these
lines are "portable." Even the large automated manufacturing systems
can be disassembled and moved to other locations if the company decides
to close this plant. Hence, although new investments are crucial and
indicative of long-term job security, they do not necessarily guarantee
the long-term existence of a particular plant.
In addition to the rules and restrictions on technological innovation
that had reduced plant performance, the labor relations climate at the
plant was poor. A management spokesperson quoted some statistics to
substantiate the existence of such a climate. In 1965, when the plant
had approximately 3500 employees, there were 6700 disciplinary ac
tions. In addition, 200-300 grievances were filed each month. Industrial
relations was so chaotic that it simply could not be managed. For its
part, management was guilty of playing the same kind of game the union
did. Managerial decisions would not be made on the basis of optimal
operating procedures or efficient operations, but on the basis of gain
ing leverage for the upcoming round of negotiations. Environmental
improvements would be deferred until negotiations occurred, for ex
ample. Union grievances concerning these items could then be traded
off against other kinds of demands by the union.
Moreover, the plant has been among the last to settle its local negotia
tions in each round of bargaining with the corporation. During the 1980
negotiations, this plant was last, but it was during these negotiations
that the relationship between the parties began to turn around.
A management spokesperson pointed to poor relations at the personal
level as a capstone element that characterized managerial views of the
plant. In most plants, an underlying union/employee interest has usually
motivated union leadership behavior. Attacks on management have been
made, but they have come out of a concern for protecting the union©s
interests. In this plant, that motivation has had a tendency to be lost
among the personal attacks intended to destroy individuals. For this
reason, the interpersonal relationships at the plant during the 1960s and
1970s were extremely poor. This perception by corporate management,
many of whom had actually worked in the plant, was a major factor
in targeting the plant for closure.
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In summary, this plant was distinguished by its poor operational per
formance and poor labor-management relations prior to 1980.
Throughout the company, agreements had been changed to provide for
greater latitude and flexibility on the part of management so that it could
respond to the "new economic climate" of the auto industry as it
developed through the late 1970s and early 1980s. In other locations,
where less emphasis has been placed on written work rules and "working
by the book," this movement has been difficult, but not impossible to
implement. In the Cleveland plant, however, lack of interpersonal trust
and the historical reliance on tight language created a condition in which
the members of the union and management felt uncomfortable with
flexibility.

Employer Decision
In the environment of the 1979 national negotiations, the corpora
tion had flexibility because of excess capacity. Consolidation, work
transfer, and plant closure were clearly possible. In late 1979, the cor
poration undertook a study of the Cleveland plant in comparison with
other plants in the same product division. A company spokesperson,
who was a member of the study team, is convinced that the company
was not bluffing when it threatened to close the plant unless local agree
ment modifications were made.
The plant©s performance and costs were so far out of line with those
of other plants producing the same product that there was no justifica
tion for keeping this facility open, particularly in light of the excess
capacity of other plants. In short, performance to budget expectations,
quality, and the labor relations "climate" at the Cleveland plant led
to such a poor corporate perception of this plant that its future was clearly
in question. Although a specific decision to close the plant had not been
made at the time of the 1979-80 negotiations, this option was being
considered.

Union Awareness/Decision Process
Three factors are useful to understanding the success of negotiations
in this case: (1) the way the union became aware of the potential plant
closing, in particular the local president©s sensitivity to his plant©s situa
tion; (2) the reason for the corporation©s credibility namely, the local
president©s careful investigation of the facts, both at the local level and
with the assistance of the international union; and (3) the local presi-
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dent©s ability to present the case to the local membership and obtain
their ratification of the changes. The way the union became aware of
the potential closure and the decision process by which the plant was
ultimately saved are so intertwined that a discreet discussion of these
two elements is not possible in this case.
Substantive negotiations with the company were limited. The com
pany advised the union that if its "bare bones" offer concerning changes
in local working conditions were not adopted, it intended to close the
facility. During the course of the local union©s investigation, its con
tacts with the corporation in Detroit and its communications with the
international union, the local president recognized that the demands made
by the company were no more onerous than those placed upon, and
accepted by, other local unions producing the same products elsewhere.
Therefore, it is not the negotiations process between the company and
union which deserves special attention here, but the three crucial elements
noted above.
In 1979, master contract negotiations led to a new nationwide con
tract between the corporation and the national union. In July of that
year the parties at the Cleveland plant commenced negotiations for a
new local supplemental agreement. The company attempted to modify
certain terms of the agreement, but little headway had been made by
early 1980. The local president had been in office for less than a year
at that point when a rumor reached him that an entire production line
representing a substantial portion of the bargaining unit was going to
be moved to another corporate location. There were several other rumors
relating to smaller moves to different locations. He decided that investiga
tion of these rumors would be appropriate.
He met with the national director of the union responsible for cor
porate level labor-management relations. The national director agreed
to set up a meeting in Detroit between the local president and selected
corporate officials including the corporate vice-president for manufac
turing. The corporate vice-president bluntly indicated that this particular
local union had been more militant than others in the company over
the years and that the company had made a larger number of conces
sions on various work rules at the Cleveland plant that caused it to be
relatively inefficient compared with similar plants in the corporation.
He stated that unless the work rules were modified and brought into
line with conditions at other plants, the Cleveland plant would be clos
ed. Finally, he agreed to provide a list of proposals the company need-
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ed to keep the plant open. The international union was also able to supply
information concerning work rules, practices, and excess capacity in
other plants. The local president was aware that the plant had been allow
ed to deteriorate physically to a point where he thought that the com
pany might not keep the plant open in any event. He was absolutely
certain that there was no bluff involved in this case.
Subsequently, the local president met with his bargaining committee
in Cleveland. He laid before the committee all the results of his investiga
tions and conversations. At this time he encountered substantial resistance
from the other members of the committee. They simply did not want
to raise the issue of concessions on work rules with the membership.
They understood the facts, but they would not believe the company©s
threat to close the Cleveland plant. Their inclination was to "stonewall"
the company on its proposed work rule changes. The local president
was the only member of the bargaining committee who supported a
ratification of the company©s position.
About this time, the corporate vice-president for manufacturing came
to Cleveland at the invitation of local plant management. He attended
one of the local negotiating sessions and reiterated his position concern
ing the needs of the company and its intentions. At that point he was
challenged by the international union representative present at the meeting
to put his statements ("threats") into writing. Very shortly thereafter,
a letter outlining the company©s needs was presented to the union by
the local industrial relations manager. The letter also stated:
. . . unless there is agreement to such changes and ratifica
tion by union members, the company will begin phasing out
plant operations. It is anticipated that the phasing out would
be concluded by the end of 1980.
The international representative confirmed to a project interviewer that
this was a new twist for the company in negotiations. There had been
frequent offhand comments about closing facilities in the past, but never
before had company officials taken such a strong position and been will
ing to put it in writing. Moreover, the representative confirmed that
the international union was able to determine output levels and capaci
ty for other plants producing the same product. It was clear to the in
ternational that the company had more than enough capacity in other
plants to absorb completely all that was being produced in the Cleveland
plant.
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On the other hand, not all employees at the plant were convinced,
even at that point. One dissident suggested that the concession agree
ment was pushed by the local president solely because the skilled trades
group wanted new product runs assigned to the Cleveland plant and
the trades knew they would not be assigned to Cleveland until an agree
ment was in place. In the dissident©s view, management was using the
Cleveland plant as an experiment to see what it could get. According
to the dissident, even though the capacity of the corporation was suffi
cient to cover the output produced by the Cleveland plant at the time
of negotiations, the company would have had to reopen the plant at some
later point in time anyway. Another dissident subsequently published
a newsletter in which he characterized the local president as "the con
cession king."
Despite the opposition from his bargaining committee, the president
of the local decided to call a general membership meeting to discuss
the company©s proposals. Historically, the bargaining unit had been led
by the bargaining committee and had adopted bargaining committee
recommendations on negotiations. With a split committee, however,
the membership would be forced to make a decision. At the meeting
no vote was taken. The purpose of the meeting was to present informa
tion, to allow all members to express their views, and to permit the
members to ask questions. The local president advised the members
to take the matter home, talk about it with their families, and decide
what they would do in a vote to be cast three days later. He argued
that if the plant were closed, members who were 40-45 years of age
or older would simply be unable to get decent jobs of any kind, given
the state of the labor market in 1980 in Cleveland. His attitude toward
the younger militants in the union was "we got all this stuff, so its ours
to give back." He invited them to negotiate their own contracts after
all the old timers had retired.
The president©s view was that the "ball game" (i.e., the economic
climate) was quite a bit different in 1980 than it was in the 1960s. The
president explained: "We used to kick the company©s ass to get what
we wanted. Now it©s the other way around. ... If you give them a
hassle, they©ll take their game somewhere else."
The result of the election was an 88 percent vote to accept the changes
proposed by the company.
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Contributing Factors
Management at the Cleveland plant over the past 25 years clearly
contributed to the poor labor-management relationship and low level
of plant performance. High turnover has been a major factor. Managers
assigned to this plant viewed their jobs as temporary, never permanent.
Often, in order to encourage people to accept assignments to the
Cleveland plant, corporate managers promised them early transfers out
if they would simply agree to take the job for a few years. Selfpreservation or survival were a manager©s principal goals; the plant©s
performance was secondary. Over the years, there have been individuals
who have come into the plant with expectations about changing things.
Universally, however, these people have been lucky to escape with their
scalps, according to one interviewee.
In 1980 the plant had a new plant manager who was "up from the
ranks." A charismatic and believable leader, he had a friendly rapport
with everyone in the plant from top management to line worker. This
manager©s appointment at the time when the company©s bargaining
power, due to economic circumstances, was greatest, clearly worked
in favor of the adoption of management©s position by the bargaining unit.
Perhaps a more important consideration was the commitment of the
local union president. He had a broad understanding of the environ
ment facing the auto producers in the United States today and realized
that the competitive environment was different from what it had been
in the 1950s or 1960s. He was part of a tour group to visit Japanese
automobile plants and had an appreciation for the kind of competition
the company faced. In his speech to the membership before the ratifica
tion vote, he pointed out that certain other unions had not been flexible
and that the results could be seen. In particular, he was alluding to the
rubber and steel industries.
The local president was characterized by one interviewee as "not par
ticularly impressive to meet" and certainly "not the world©s greatest
orator." On the other hand, he was viewed by both management and
the bargaining unit members as sincere, honest, and hard-working. In
part, his credibility arose from the fact that he had been a bargaining
unit member and active in the union leadership at the plant almost since
its inception in 1954. At one time, he was as militant as anyone else
in the plant, but his long-term attachment to the plant gave him a stake
in the continued operation of it. He did not want to preside over its
demise.

Why Plants Are Saved 61

His popularity is illustrated by the fact that after the vote to accept
the management proposals in 1980, he was twice re-elected to the of
fice of local president. Moreover, when the regional director©s posi
tion was vacant several years ago, his local supported him for that
position.
One explanation for the instability of labor-management relations and
militancy of union leadership at the Cleveland plant is the way in which
union officers are elected. There is an election in the local union every
year to fill various positions. Although there is not a complete turnover
of officers each year, there is always a slate of candidates with en
dorsements and, as a result, in the words of one spokesman, "there
is nearly always a pot boiling somewhere." Part of the reason for the
current stability at the Cleveland plant has to do with the long-term in
cumbency of the present local president. There was a consensus among
individuals interviewed that although the local president had some op
position in the local, it was neither significant nor cohesive. One inter
viewee said that the dissidents, who are still around, "are people who
can©t see reality when it is looking them squarely in the face." His view
was that they tend to lack the respect of the vast majority of the bargaining
unit and, therefore, are of little consequence.
Undoubtedly, had the economic climate been less bleak, ratification
of the agreement would not likely have occurred, regardless of who
was plant manager or local president. On the other hand, without the
style of leadership present on both sides, even the economic realities
facing this plant would not have moved the rank and file to ratify the
changes that were made in the work rules. In short, both the economic
environment and the leadership style were necessary components to save
this plant.
Another element that contributed to successful negotiations in this
case was the international union. Both the international representative
and higher level officials in the union provided information and con
tacts for the local president that were helpful to his obtaining the "facts"
for decisionmaking by the local. Without this support, it is doubtful
that the local union membership, or even the local president himself
would have been convinced that the company was not bluffing. It is
important to note, however, that the international never endorsed any
position in the local referendum on the new local conditions agreement.
The key issues that caused the Cleveland plant to be at the bottom
of the company©s productivity/performance measure, and to be perceived
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by top management as the "worst" plant in the company with regard
to labor-management relations, were clearly under the control of local
negotiators. Hence, there was an opportunity for local individuals to
have an impact on saving their plant.

Final Outcome
The most important rules modifications in the 1980 agreement related
to: (1) reduction of wash-up time, (2) permission for crew leaders to
work with tools under limited circumstances, (3) expansion of duties
for certain occupational titles, (4) elimination of the requirement that
millwrights accompany the movement of maintenance parts,
(5) permission of maintenance tradesmen to drive fork-lift trucks as
"tools of their trade," and (6) modification of the way production stan
dards were applied in the plant. The production standards element con
tained thirteen paragraphs which substantially tightened the application
of standards and, most important, the agreement eliminated "phantom
production."
The union president indicated that the company had showed good faith
as a result of the approval of the agreement. As soon as the contract
was ratified, the company moved work back into the plant that had been
contracted out or that had been moved to other locations in the com
pany. There was a commitment from the top of the corporation to abide
by the agreement even though there had been no written commitment
on the part of the company to make any changes following the approval
of the local agreement.
Other significant developments in the plant involve the use of an
employee participation team concept that has been very effective.
Although it is far from a permanent feature in the plant, according to
one management spokesman, this concept has considerable support from
both labor and management. The teamwork has improved communica
tions and commitment on the part of the workforce substantially. A
related effect of this settlement has been the reduction in grievance ac
tivities and disciplinary actions. As compared with the earlier time
period, there have been fewer than 100 disciplinary actions taken in
the past year and most of these were for absenteeism. Only about 300
grievances had been filed for the entire bargaining unit in the past year.
In other words, compared with the earlier era in plant history,
disciplinary actions and grievances are down by approximately 90
percent.
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Inferences
The local union president©s initiative to investigate what he had
perceived and the rumors he had heard was the most important element
in this case. The assistance and cooperation of the international union
in this investigation was essential. If there had been no groundwork
by the local president, the industrial relations climate in the plant (the
lack of trust and traditional militancy) coupled with a vocal group of
dissidents would undoubtedly have led the union to reject the agree
ment modifications proposed by management.
There is no way to be sure the company was not bluffing in its threat
to close the plant. Management©s willingness to put such a threat in
writing for the first time, the fact that other corporation plants had been
closed, and the general attitude of top management toward this plant
based on its performance and labor climate relative to other plants in
its division, all suggest that there was no bluff. Moreover, the local
president and the international representative, both experienced
negotiators, were convinced the company threat was genuine.
By bringing local practices into line with those at other plants, the
parties gave the Cleveland plant at least an even chance for survival.
The implementation of the worker participation plan and a commitment
to controlling labor costs suggests that the long-run prognosis for this
plant is positive.
Wrapping Materials4
The plant was built in the early 1950s and was acquired by a large
chemical company in 1956 to produce a variety of flexible packaging
materials. The present owner, a manufacturer based outside Ohio, pur
chased the plant in 1974 and has continued to produce much the same
product for distribution to food, pharmaceutical and photographic
material producers. Throughout the period from 1960 to 1975, employ
ment varied slightly with the business cycle but remained at approx
imately 400 employees. After the conclusion of an 89-day strike in
1977-78, 120 people were laid off "permanently." Further cutbacks
resulted in a total hourly workforce of about 170 in 1982.
Employer Decision
From the time of the 89-day strike, the corporation made no plans
to introduce new products or technology into the plant. By 1981, cor-
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porate investment allocation decisions had been announced to upgrade
and modernize corporate facilities nationwide, but nothing had been
designated for the Cleveland plant. The plant manager concluded that
the "handwriting was on the wall" for the Cleveland plant. Competing
products and new technologies for producing his plant©s products were
beginning to erode sales and profit margins. With no new investment,
the plant could not survive. Although he had been given no timetable
by the corporation, he inferred that the plant would last only a few more
years.
The 1981 investment decisions had been announced at the annual
employee meeting in the company cafeteria. It was at that time that the
plant manager first became aware of them. Most of the corporate in
vestments were targeted for specific locations in existing plants. A few
projects had been identified, but their location had not yet been fixed.
Among the investments that had not yet been placed was a $6 million
laminate extruder line which was to produce, for example, plastic
toothpaste tubes.
The plant manager was committed to the Cleveland plant and the
Cleveland area, so he decided to go after one of these new product lines
for his plant. He recognized, however, that because of the image of
the Cleveland plant at corporate headquarters (due in part to the 89-day
strike), his goal would be difficult to achieve. Although only 20 to 30
new employees would be utilized in the new process, the manager realiz
ed that a $6 million investment in the Cleveland plant would reflect
an attitude change concerning the plant at corporate headquarters and
help to secure its future.

Union Awareness
In early 1982, the plant manager approached the union president to
discuss the situation and a solution. It is noteworthy that the plant
manager went to the union president©s office on the plant floor, although
the two had previously had a somewhat less than amicable relationship.
The union president reported that at this long meeting there was a com
plete airing of many of the problems that had been brought to light as
a result of the 1977-78 strike and subsequent developments at the plant.
The union president found the plant manager entirely credible with
regard to the future of the plant. Furthermore, the president admitted
that he and other members of the bargaining unit knew that the future
of the plant was at stake. He was aware that a "sister plant" in Penn-
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sylvania had been closed. It was clear that the corporation was con
solidating into its more profitable areas. Moreover, the union leader
knew that corporate management had identified the local union at the
plant as "too militant."
The plant manager indicated to the local union president that new
products had to be brought into the plant because much of the existing
product mix and production technology was slowly becoming obsolete.
Without new products the plant was doomed. The two discussed the
corporate investment plans that had been laid out at the employee
meeting, including the new extruder product line to be built by the com
pany in one of several alternative locations. It was implicit that cor
porate planners had eliminated Cleveland as a possible extruder site
because of the militant union situation, although Cleveland had numerous
other advantages in the competition for the new product line such as
potential governmental support and a skilled workforce.
Decision Process
The local union president called his international union. Both the in
ternational representative and his boss, the district director, became in
volved. It was soon apparent to the latter that although contractual con
cessions would be necessary to gain the new extruder line, coopera
tion from local public officials could also help with the infusion of public
subsidies. Mayor Voinovich of Cleveland and Cuyahoga County com
missioners were called upon for assistance. An Urban Development Ac
tion Grant of $600,000 was made available and industrial revenue bonds
were issued by the county. The mayor also interceded with top cor
porate officials by inviting them to Cleveland for a meeting around the
issue.
In the meantime, frequent union-management meetings were held to
discuss contract revisions. Attendance expanded to include all local union
officers as well as corporate employee relations representatives. A major
problem for management concerned layoffs that caused certain senior
individuals who were not adequately qualified to operate equipment to
"bump into" such equipment when employment declined. This was
an existing problem, and one that would grow worse, in management©s
opinion, if the new extruder process were introduced. Serious difficulties
in quality control and output had already been experienced; these con
ditions were expected to deteriorate further.
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Management©s original proposal called for departmental seniority to
replace plantwide seniority. The parties eventually agreed to limit bump
ing on certain equipment to individuals who had bona fide qualifica
tions to run the job. A number of existing positions were identified,
along with the key positions in the proposed new extrusion line.
The 1982 agreement to modify the seniority provision was made
operable for a period of only one year, except for the proposed new
extruding department. The cover letter to the proposal stated that "the
changes will apply permanently to the extruding department contingent
on the new extruder line coming to the Cleveland plant." In other words,
the union made its concession on work rules contingent on the addi
tional investment in the plant. Moreover, there was a tacit understand
ing that the new seniority provisions would be permanent after the oneyear period, provided the extruding equipment actually came into
existence.
After the supplemental agreement on seniority had been concluded,
the parties pursued other areas in which the company had problems,
particularly the large number of wage classifications and the overtime
rules. In 1983, the collective bargaining agreement was extended and
the modifications on these issues were incorporated.

Contributing Factors
Both the union and management spokesmen acknowledged that cer
tain external elements were involved in the corporate decision to locate
the new extrusion process in Cleveland. Many public officials, including
the mayor and City Council, county commissioners, members of Con
gress, state representatives, and the Cleveland Growth Association played
a role. In addition to the jobs created, it was important to demonstrate
that a concerted effort to save jobs for Cleveland could be mounted.
Success was essential for more than the employees of the plant. It was
viewed as a key indicator of the future for manufacturing in Cleveland.
The plant manager and plant employee relations manager were key
figures in this case. The plant manager came to the plant shortly after
it had been purchased by the corporation and was committed to its con
tinued operation. Both management and union spokespeople credited
his "generalship" as the key element in saving the plant. The plant
employee relations manager had been employed in the plant since shortly
after it was constructed in the 1950s. He was at one time a member
of the bargaining unit and the president of the local union. According
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to him, the labor-management relationship under the previous owner
was very poor. There had been several wildcat strikes, apparently not
without some provocation. "The relationship took the plant right down
the drain." He stated that for 17 years while the plant was under the
previous owner, it was rarely profitable.
The plant manager and union president agreed in their assessment
of the plant©s previous owner and the impact of management attitudes
on labor-management relations. The local president©s view was that
although the former owners had a contract, they did not abide by it.
In his words, their attitude was, "We©ll violate the contract anytime
we please and you can grieve if you like." The president indicated that
as a shop steward he had personally filed over 927 written grievances
in a four-year period. This number does not include other grievances
which were settled verbally.
The change in ownership brought in a whole new management
philosophy, however. For the most part, the local president feels that
under present ownership, management attempts to abide by the agree
ment and to be fair with the workforce. The union has responded slow
ly to the change in management. In 1983, only 12 written grievances
were filed in the local. The president defended the pre-1974 militancy
of the union on the grounds that the previous owner©s policies had man
dated such a response.
The president identified paid leave for union officials as the crucial
issue in the 1977-78 negotiations. Under the previous owner©s last con
tract, a total of six union committeemen and officers had been permit
ted to be full-time paid union representatives. After purchasing the plant,
the new owner declared that it would not accept this arrangement.
Although it honored the existing agreement and promised that it would
continue to do so until the terms of office expired for the existing union
officers, the new owner demanded that the clause for paid union leave
be removed from the contract.
Following ratification of the contract in 1978, a new election for union
officers was scheduled. The bargaining unit gradually became aware
of what had held up the settlement so long and reacted accordingly.
The present president had not been a part of the bargaining team. He
ran with a completely new slate of union officers. This group was swept
into office and has retained office since the 1978 election. Most of these
leaders have been unopposed in more recent elections.
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Most important, local plant management saw the union election as
a mandate to the leaders to stop their militant ways. In retrospect,
management sees the 1977-78 strike as having at least one good
element it opened the eyes of both union members and management
as to what would be necessary to save the plant. The parties finally began
to talk to each other. The salaried people who came in during the strike
to run the equipment began to appreciate the hourly workers© contribu
tion and hourly workers developed a willingness to talk to management.
The wall separating labor and management began to crumble.

Final Outcome
A Cleveland Plain Dealer editor characterized the events at the plant
as the "miracle on Dobeckmun Ave." 5 (The plant is located on
Dobeckmun Avenue in Cleveland.) The vice-president and general
manager of the corporate division that owns the plant stated that, "the
turnaround of the last two and one-half years has been nothing short
of incredible and perhaps even miraculous.©© The mayor stated that the
"project is probably Cleveland©s very best example of a successful part
nership of all levels of government, private business, and labor work
ing toward the same goals jobs and a strong position in the market
place."
With the labor agreement adjustments, none of which involved pay
cuts for existing workers, the obvious new industrial relations climate
at the plant, and the tangible public support, corporate decisionmakers
agreed to locate the new laminate extruder in Cleveland. The decision
produced 68 jobs with the promise of more and the retention of ex
isting workers.
This case has one unique feature that distinguishes it from the previous
three in this chapter and ties it more closely to chapter 4. That is tim
ing. As the Plain Dealer reporter stated, "Rather than play catch-up
after a closing was announced, government, labor and business officials
did something immediately when trouble was sensed."
A key element was the initiative of the plant manager in discussing
the plant with his local union president. A candid manager who was
willing to take some risk, a politically secure local union leadership,
and support from the international union with respect to local union
issues and the larger external political environment were ingredients
for success.
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Perhaps most important was the availability of corporate capital and
plans for the development of a new product line somewhere. No matter
how amicable the relationship might have grown to be at the Cleveland
plant, a corporate decision to invest in an extruder line was indispens
able. The existing plant was conducive to the new product line, the line
had to go somewhere, so the successful set of events in Cleveland was,
in part, due to a happy coincidence as well as to a significant effort
on the part of the parties.
Summary
External forces macroeconomic conditions, economic conditions
specific to the industry, foreign competition, and technological changewere the drivers in each of the cases discussed in this chapter. It is easy
to lose sight of these larger forces when specific cases are examined.
They affect the extent to which change is necessary and the pace with
which it must be implemented. They can be insidious because, for a
time, they may yield a favorable environment for a plant to which both
labor and management grow accustomed. When conditions suddenly
change, it is often difficult for managers and especially employees to
accept. This chapter has illustrated several cases where acceptance and
response have occurred. Explaining these phenomena requires an in
stitutional examination of what has occurred.

Credibility
Recognition of a plant©s plight, and especially the acceptance by the
union of what management is saying about it, are the crucial first steps
in saving it. Several factors seem to influence credibility.
The longer the term of the relationship between the principal actors,
the greater their credibility. This observation is reasonable, but several
other observations were surprising. Whether or not the parent corporation
is in the local area seems irrelevant to the credibility dimension.
Moreover, the degree of historical militancy between the parties is not
important. These conclusions are best illustrated by a comparison of
Cleveland Twist Drill, with a local parent, where credibility was very
slow to develop (despite the presence of other factors discussed below),
with Ohio Rubber and Wrapping Materials, both of which had distant
corporate parents, where credibility, at least at the union leadership level,
was not a major problem.
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A corollary of the conclusion that a long-term relationship is helpful
is the finding that management must make its position clear by different
means from those used in the past. Only a long-term relationship allows
such a comparison. In Auto Parts, the willingness of corporate executives
to put their threat to close the Cleveland plant in writing convinced the
international representative that there was no bluff. In other cases, more
extensive (verifiable) data were provided to the union than had ever
been made available before. In every case, there was "something dif
ferent" about management©s presentation of itself and its position as
compared with the way the same managers had behaved in the past.
Several elements are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions to achieve
credibility. "Equality of sacrifice" is a phrase that has achieved recent
popularity. To convince the rank and file that contract modifications
are necessary, they must see that management is also suffering cuts in
manpower or wages and benefits. Closure of other plants is also clear
evidence of corporate sincerity concerning the closure threat. The reality
of a nearby plant closure also affected the rank and file at Ohio Rub
ber, helping them to realize that even the strongest plants are not invin
cible. "Seeing" is not quite "believing," but it helps. Although the
layoff of nearly half the white-collar workforce did not, itself, convince
the workers at Cleveland Twist Drill that the plant might be closed,
it is doubtful the negotiations to save the plant could have been suc
cessful without the layoff.
Another element that seems to be a part of most successful negotia
tions is the presentation of substantial data to employees. Not only plant
profitability, but also comparisons of wages, benefits and work rules
with other plants or competitors were discussed in an open meeting in
most cases. Again, such sharing seems to be a necessary but not suffi
cient condition to save a plant. Truck Components (from chapter 2)
provided the most extensive sharing of data, but the plant closed anyway.
In fairness, negotiations were successful in the sense that the union agreed
with management©s demands, but economic conditions simply over
whelmed that plant.
A final factor that seems especially helpful is a history of demonstrated
good faith in negotiations. At Ohio Rubber, the company moved pro
duction of wiper blades to Cleveland after modifications in the agree
ment were agreed upon. Even though it was not required by the agree
ment, the company brought a production line back to Auto Parts that
had been taken elsewhere sometime prior to the agreement. The local
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president pointed to that as evidence of good faith and a significant factor
for future negotiations.
Responses
Conclusions regarding appropriate union response and strategy in plant
closing negotiations will be addressed in the final chapter. Here the
discussion is limited to a few observations.
In several cases, e.g., Ohio Rubber and Wrapping Materials, con
cern for plant and job security led the union, with some prompting by
management, to negotiate for new production lines and jobs and the
introduction of new technology at the plant. Agreements in this area
tended to be informal and not part of the collective bargaining agree
ment. A letter guaranteeing investment in return for work rule changes
was provided at Wrapping Materials. At Ohio Rubber, Auto Parts, and
Wrapping Materials, union spokespeople agreed that such concessions
by management did more for job security than any contractual terms
regarding severance pay or the perpetuation of narrow job descriptions.
They were also helpful in persuading the leadership, if not the rank
and file, to agree to the contractual modification being requested by
the company.
Union Politics
To understand why plant closing negotiations can fail, even in the
face of undeniable economic facts, one must appreciate the union as
a democratic political institution. The willingness and ability of local
or international leaders to try to convince the rank and file to accept
contract modifications was an important element in all four cases in
this chapter. It is also clear that plants would not have been saved had
such leadership been absent. At Cleveland Twist Drill and Wrapping
Materials there was no political opponent waiting to take advantage of
the situation. At Ohio Rubber and Auto Parts, there were opponents,
but the leaders in office were able to prevail. Had they been absent,
the opportunists would have filled the void, thus eliminating any chance
for a successful negotiation of contract changes.
As any experienced management representative knows, stable union
politics are a sine qua non for successful negotiations. The ability of
the union to act as a unified institution led by informed officers is a
necessary condition for saving plants and jobs.
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NOTES
1. Audrey Freedman, "Plant Closed No Jobs," Industrial Management
(May-June 1981), p. 13, emphasis added.

2. Cleveland Plain Dealer, June 18, 1982.
3. At the request of union and management spokespeople, the name and loca
tion of this plant have been withheld.
4. At the request of union and management spokespeople, the name of this
plant and company have been withheld.

5. Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 21, 1984.

4
Securing the Future

It is clear that saving plants and jobs is dependent on securing new
product lines and production processes for an existing plant, as hap
pened at Ohio Rubber and Wrapping Materials. Sometimes the
technological change is so significant, or the scale of change is so great,
that expansion at the existing site is simply not practical. In such cir
cumstances, the company faces a decision on where, not whether, to
locate new facilities.
In the terms of chapter 1, the company and union are in the middle
act of the tragedy scenario in such cases. If the new facility is located
well away from the existing facility, it may lead not just to the closure
of the existing facility, but lost opportunity for saving jobs as well. A
nearby location, however, enhances the prospect for an orderly transi
tion with no job loss.
One of the reasons an employer would consider an altogether new
location is to avoid dealing with an existing union. A new local site
is much more likely to be organized by the same local union than a
more distant one. The strength of the employer©s desire to avoid the
existing union is naturally related to anticipated labor costs for the new
plant and the quality of the labor climate. Negotiations that enhance
the labor climate and moderate anticipated labor costs in the new plant
are therefore in the interests of an existing union if one of its goals is
to enhance job security for its members. In this study, we encountered
two cases that illustrate such negotiations. Neither was simple and
without acrimony. In both, the company did not achieve all it sought.
It is important to distinguish these cases from those where an explicit
threat to close has been made. From the viewpoint of both parties, there
does not appear to be as much at stake. It is difficult for employees,
facing no imminent threat of job loss, to understand why they should
make any concessions at all. The quid pro quo is difficult for them to
evaluate. Then too, the contractual modifications requested by manage
ment may have very little effect on employees who remain in the old
facility. Again, the long-term implications are difficult to evaluate. In
73
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short, negotiations under these circumstances are likely to be different,
though not necessarily any less difficult, from those in a plant closing
situation.
Air Spring 1
Prior to 1981, the corporation in this case designed and manufac
tured prototype air springs for the auto industry, to replace the tradi
tional steel coil spring, in a small area of an existing plant. Because
demand for its air spring was going to exceed its production capacity
in the prototype manufacturing facility, the company decided to build
a new "greenfield" plant for the production of air springs. The cor
poration, which is based in Northeast Ohio but has worldwide produc
tion facilities, was actively considering several possible sites. One of
these was in a small town in the same county as its headquarters, its
prototype plant, and other production facilities. The fact that the loca
tion was within the county was significant because the local union claimed
that a clause in the existing labor agreement required that all produc
tion facilities within the county, existing or developed during the term
of the agreement, would be covered by its agreement. (The fact that
the company disagreed is not material because the union©s claim alone
would create a controversy in the event the plant were located locally.)
Moreover, the collective bargaining agreement allowed for seniority
and bumping rights for bargaining unit members across plants throughout
the local.
A site in Nebraska was also being considered by the corporation. The
corporation expected that operations at either site would be unionized,
but a Nebraska facility would not have been subject to the existing master
or local labor agreements. The president of the local union was aware
that some members of management viewed Nebraska as a more desirable
site. He also knew that the corporation had closed plants in the past
decade due to high labor costs, among other reasons.
Employer Decision
The corporation had some financial stake, as well as a moral com
mitment, in the community in which it was located. Local relocation
of a facility that would eventually employ up to 350 workers as de
mand grew would clearly send a positive signal throughout the com
munity. Corporate planners believed, however, that the wage and work-
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ing conditions targeted as critical to the success of the air springs opera
tions would not be accepted by union leaders and workers in the com
munity. The local union had not made any wage or fringe concessions
to the company since 1947. Although the corporation executives ex
pected the Nebraska site would be unionized, its work rules, overtime
rules and bumping process would compare favorably with similar rules
in plants organized in Ohio.

Union Awareness
The local union was the bargaining representative for many nonexempt employees in corporate headquarters. The local©s offices were
directly across the street from the corporate offices and, as a result of
this proximity, local officers and members had greater access to rumors
and other "inside information" than might have been true at more dis
tant locations.
In late 1980, the local president first learned of the corporation©s in
tentions to build a new Air Spring plant through an off-hand remark
by a management official during a meeting on a completely unrelated
matter. The manager suggested that the local president "check out"
a rumor he had heard that a new Air Spring plant was about to be built
in Nebraska.
The local president as well as international union representatives had
watched the decline of jobs in their industry in Northeast Ohio for over
a decade. They perceived the building of a new Air Spring plant out
side the area as a "loss" even though very few jobs would be lost im
mediately. For that reason, the local president called the corporate chair
man about the situation. In a meeting with the chairman, union represen
tatives were advised that the company did intend to build the plant in
Nebraska, but that no firm commitments had been made. He was also
informed that a site in the area was a possibility, but that given the labor
agreement, the corporation could not seriously consider it. The union
president urged the chairman to make no assumptions regarding the
union©s position on needed contract modifications. The chairman assured
him that there would be more discussions with the union before a final
decision was made, but he continued to be pessimistic.
Almost simultaneously, another issue of major importance arose con
cerning the National Master Agreement and all the locals governed by
it. For many years, the Master Agreement provided per se double time
for Sunday work regardless of total hours worked during the week. At
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one of its plants in a different state, the company and a different local
negotiated a modification to this Sunday overtime rule applicable to that
local only. The terms of the Master Agreement allowed such local
modifications, provided a majority of all the locals covered by the Master
approved it.
Although the local president had already cast his vote on the issue,
he reminded corporate representatives of his role in that vote. In his
opinion, his vote reflected his flexibility and enabled him to win cor
porate commitment to enter negotiations concerning the new plant shortly
thereafter. Although no guarantees were made by the chairman, the im
petus toward a local site, and away from the Nebraska site, had clearly
been achieved. The corporation became committed to the local site pro
vided labor cost projections were brought within the range it needed
to operate the new facility profitably.

Decision Process
The local president was not operating in a vacuum. Before he could
reopen negotiations, it was necessary to secure local membership ap
proval. The first step was to obtain the support of his executive board,
to which he related the entire sequence of events. The board passed
a resolution of support and called a special membership meeting on the
issue. Although there was some opposition, the board©s resolution won
support from the members. The local president then selected a special
negotiating committee comprised of individuals knowledgeable about
the Air Spring operations, because most issues were related to work
rules. At that point, the parties were ready to meet formally for the
first time.
At the first negotiation session, management listed the following con
tract modifications necessary for the Ohio site to be selected:
1. Eliminate the existing COLA;
2. Limit the definition of overtime to "hours worked in excess of
the 40-hour workweek," thus allowing management to schedule plant
operations seven days per week without per se overtime rates on
weekends;
3. Disallow bumping into the new plant when layoffs occurred
elsewhere in nearby plants, thus allowing management to avoid poten
tially costly retraining; disallow bumping out of the plant to prevent
the loss of valuable training for people seeking higher pay at external
locations;
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4. Establish a lower day-work rate than had existed in the earlier pro
totype operations.
Although management remained pessimistic about the likelihood of
union members agreeing to these terms, the local president told cor
porate planners, "Put it on paper and we©ll look at it and let you know."
The local was given three months to negotiate conditions. Local leader
ship saw the company©s proposal on necessary union concessions as
excessive and believed that the excessiveness stemmed, in part, from
the desire on one corporate planner©s part to have the plant located in
Nebraska. At the same time, the local president realized that the loca
tion of the Air Spring plant in Ohio represented a rare opportunity for
growth for his local. He did not dispute the company©s need for con
cessions. The company, however, seemed to be asking for more than
the situation really required.
The company had time to ponder its plant location decision because
output expansion was needed only to meet future product demand. The
state of auto demand in 1982 was sufficiently weak that the company
was not under immediate pressure to increase output. The local presi
dent participated in a number of relocation discussions with the cor
porate chairman, the director of industrial relations and a personnel
manager involved in the project. International representatives played
a significant role in urging the corporation to open negotiations and con
sider a local plant site, but the local had complete autonomy over the
mix of economic or work rule concessions it would accept to win the
plant.
The local union had permitted productivity gains through work rule
changes and job consolidation during negotiations in prior years. In con
trast to some union leaders© hard line positions, the local president had
focused on convincing workers to "put in a full day©s work for a full
day©s pay," and thereby justify a higher wage and fringe package. Wage
or fringe concessions to ensure the relocation of the Air Spring plant
in Ohio would place the local union president in unfamiliar, and poten
tially tenuous, political circumstances.

Contributing Factors
Both proximity to corporate headquarters and leadership stability
within the union favored a heightened awareness of the company©s situa
tion by the local union. The local office was located across the street
from corporate headquarters and the international union offices were
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in the same city. Union officials had ready access to corporate executives,
up to and including the CEO, and fully exercised these access options.
Informal or formal meetings between union and company representatives
reportedly took place on a weekly basis or more frequently.
The local president had been with the corporation for approximately
40 years; the last 15 years of his 26-year tenure as a union officer were
spent as president of his local. He was, therefore, familiar with the status
of company operations, and he knew that the corporation had closed
down plants when lower wages and fringes could not be obtained. He
also knew it was unlikely the company would knowingly build a plant
in a high wage and high labor cost environment. His long-term
knowledge of the company and the industry provided him with an overall
perspective that supported, and lent credence to, the company position.
The local union president was not involved in any sort of intraunion
political struggle; therefore, he was not pressured into the more mili
tant bargaining stance which is sometimes required to appease the rank
and file. Moreover, the local had a set policy for dealing with such situa
tions. According to this policy, union negotiators would make no final
decisions. Consequently, members recognized that they would have the
ultimate responsibility to approve or disapprove the new settlement.
The management team involved in the plant location decision was
centrally located at the corporate headquarters. This factor reduced the
chances that intracompany communications would be misconstrued. Fur
thermore, local managers and corporate headquarters were not com
peting to meet their respective goals. Finally, as mentioned earlier, cor
porate leadership had more than an economic interest in the communi
ty©s economic well-being, since it was "home" to most of them.

Final Outcome
Despite the union©s traditional unwillingness to consider wage and
fringe concessions and the company©s initial predisposition to locate
in Nebraska, agreement on modified terms for a new Air Spring plant
in a nearby community was finally reached. The plant was built and
began operations in January 1981.
The local president was convinced that the existing contract language
would have been too costly to bring the plant to Ohio and persuaded
members that concessions were in their best interests. The parties agreed
to a contract that allowed the newly relocated plant to be exempt from
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areawide layoff procedures and bumping arrangements. The corpora
tion©s original proposal to have a completely independent seniority ar
rangement was not adopted, however. Laid-off employees from other
plants could sign the area hiring list and, if hired, receive credit for
prior seniority. Moreover, no bidding out of the Air Spring plant was
permitted if job openings became available in other nearby corporate
plants. Other management demands concerning scheduling, elimina
tion of COLA, and use of measured day work with no incentives were
also met. Operations began with a 90-member workforce. By mid-1985,
employment had reached about 200 in the plant.

Inferences
It is difficult to overstate the importance of the international represen
tatives© and local president©s proximity to corporate executives, and the
concomitant "inside" information that was available to them concern
ing corporate investment plans. Second, more militant leaders probably
would not have learned of the Air Spring expansion plans until it was
too late to act effectively. Watching job loss over a period of 10-15
years had taken the abrasive edge off union leaders in this case. For
that reason, management, perhaps inadvertently, was willing to let the
rumor out concerning the new plant and then pursue negotiations with
the local to see whether conditions could be set that would permit the
plant to be operated economically in Northeast Ohio.
The political security from which the local president operated gave
him the option of pursuing the tactics he did under the circumstances.
He could risk voting for the elimination ofperse Sunday overtime rates
at a sister plant and point to that to gain a commitment from the cor
porate chairman to reconsider the Air Spring plant site. Then he could
take the matter of contract modifications for the plant to his executive
committee and local membership.
Finally, it is difficult to gauge the significance of the fact that few
of those who voted for the "special agreement" on the Air Spring plant
actually contemplated working there. Even though some of them might
eventually transfer to the plant, most had jobs at other facilities that
probably seemed secure at the time of the Air Spring plant negotiations.
The special agreement for the Air Spring plant may be analogous to
two-tier bargaining to the extent that unrepresented future employees©
wages, hours and working conditions were being set in these negotia
tions. The economic conditions confronting the union and its motiva-
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tion are also similar. Two-tier bargaining, like the special Air Spring
agreement, enhances job opportunity, membership gain, and job security
for existing union members.
There are some differences, however. First, the Air Spring agree
ment was more comprehensive. From the company©s standpoint, work
rules, seniority bidding, bumping rights and per se overtime were at
least as important as wage rates in the special agreement at Air Spring.
Ordinarily, two-tier settlements discriminate only with respect to wages
and, perhaps, to a limited extent, benefits. Second, existing employees
have the potential to move into Air Spring and be covered by the revis
ed agreement language.
What Air Spring demonstrates is that "greenfield" operations need
not be far removed from existing plant locations in order for companies
to take advantage of most of the labor relations motives for starting
such operations. Locating them near existing facilities offers manage
ment, employees, and unions advantages, as well. To the extent that
the advantages for management compensate for the negotiation expense,
keeping "greenfield" plants close to the original facility is economically
rational.
Timkin Company Steel Mill
This corporation has been family-owned since its inception in St. Louis
in 1899. In 1902, it relocated to Canton in Northeast Ohio, in order
to be close to the growing automobile industry for which it produced
roller bearing axles. In 1915, the company reduced its dependence on
suppliers by building its own steel mill in which it produced the highest
quality bearing steel. By the 1940s, the corporation had become the
major employee in Canton and principal benefactor. Even though the
corporation had plants overseas, management spokespersons express
ed great loyalty to the community in which their headquarters were
located.
The company©s steelmaking capacity has always exceeded its own
needs for bearing production. Consequently, it has historically sold a
portion of its output to other users of high alloy steel even other bear
ing producers. In many cases, customers have become dependent on
the corporation for their steel supplies. Demand for company bearings
in the 1970s, however, grew to a point where well over half of its steel
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output was being consumed internally and long-term customers were
being forced to look elsewhere for supplies. At that point, the com
pany began to explore the expansion of its steel production.
In the course of such investigations, the company discovered a number
of technological breakthroughs in steel production that had the poten
tial to enhance quality well beyond what the company could produce
in its existing mills. To maintain its position as a world leader in quali
ty steel and as a major supplier of such steel, the company developed
plans to build a new state-of-the-art mill. Management expected that
only about 30 percent of the mill©s output would be used internally and
that the rest could be available for sale. Plans for the plant were an
nounced early in 1981.

Company Decision
The company©s decision to build a new plant was based on considera
tions of quality and production capacity, similar to the air spring plant
of the preceding case. Labor relations issues became relevant only with
respect to location. The new technology of the mill required flexibility
in assigning work and broader job descriptions than existed in the old
facility. Moreover, management could not agree to the same incentive
pay program for the new mill.
The company evaluated potential sites in Tennessee and Virginia in
addition to a location within several miles of its old mill and corporate
headquarters. Unlike Air Spring, management in this case was predispos
ed to locate the new mill near its headquarters rather than out-of-state
for a variety of reasons. The company realized it had a unique leader
ship role and a high degree of influence in the community a set of
desirable circumstances not easily duplicable elsewhere.
Management©s predisposition explains why it initiated discussions with
the union concerning contract modifications. (In Air Spring, manage
ment had the opposite predisposition and would probably have built its
new spring plant in Nebraska had the union not initiated discussions
on the matter.)

Union Awaremess
The company notified the union of its intentions and needs and re
quested a meeting with the union to discuss the issues. It was the belief
of the local union president that company interest in locating the plant
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outside Ohio was only cursory. This belief was shared by other union
members, leading the company to include the following statement in
an information packet given to its employees:
Is there any truth to the rumor that the company investigated
building the steel mill in the South only to put pressure on
us here . . . ?
There©s not a word of truth to that rumor.
The company officially maintained that Northeast Ohio was merely one
of several sites being reviewed and that while management would
recognize the existing union in the new mill if a new mill were to be
built locally the union would have to agree to concessions before the
local site was selected.
There was little doubt that all factions of the union realized how
desirable it would be for the new mill to be located locally. Although
the corporation was still hiring in 1981 when the negotiations were taking
place, employees were laid off by the hundreds beginning in 1982.
Local union leaders and other union members felt that the company
was acting opportunistically. Serious cutbacks in nearby Youngstown
and the closure of one steel mill there had set the stage for major con
cessions in national steel negotiations. Timkin was not part of national
negotiations, nor was it facing the same market conditions for its
unique products. In the view of union negotiators, it was arguable
whether the company needed any substantial union concessions in order
to be persuaded to opt for the local mill site. The company, as describ
ed by a union spokesperson, had always operated from a position of
highly centralized control; plant locations outside the region might lessen
headquarters© ability to adequately monitor the new mill©s operations.
The local president believed that the corporation was likely to locate
the new mill nearby regardless of union concessions. However, neither
he nor the international representative cared to take a stance adamantly
opposed to concessions only to discover that the company was not bluff
ing. The new mill would represent 800 new members to the local union
and increase job security for all employees.
The package of union concessions, which the corporation claimed
was necessary to assure the location of the new steel mill in the area,
was not solely confined to operations within the proposed mill. The
company also wanted concessions from union members who would con-
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tinue working in the existing steel plant. These demands led some union
members to feel that the company was using the new mill negotiations
to back out of its existing labor agreement. Among other demands, the
company wanted current employees to agree to give up their incentive
premium. Over the years since it was initially installed by the com
pany, the incentive premium plan had resulted in unintended "over
payments" to a number of employees. Naturally, the beneficiaries of
these payments were reluctant to give them up.

Decision Process
Historically, the company had assumed the initiator©s role in the deci
sion process in labor relations, taking a very formal stance in any of
its meetings with the union. All meetings were transcribed, and a com
pany spokesman indicated that no informal off-the-record meetings
occurred.
It is not surprising therefore that the corporation was in the "driver©s
seat" throughout negotiations concerning the new mill location. The
first company proposal required the union to make concessions in ex
change for consideration of Northeast Ohio as a possible site. The union©s
position was that any concessions on its part would be conditioned on
a decision to locate the plant in Northeast Ohio.
Wishing to move forward with negotiations, the company agreed to
discussions without preconditions in June 1981. Assuming a typically
aggressive labor relations stance, company negotiators laid out all their
new proposals pertaining to the steel mill site without encouraging any
give-and-take process. One item of considerable importance was a nostrike pledge at the new mill site until 1992. The company©s position
was that regardless of where it was located, it could not afford to have
the mill shut down at any time during its initial start-up phase. The com
pany also demanded the elimination of incentive pay at both the new
and existing mills. According to the local president©s account of the
June meeting, neither he nor the international representative interjected
any objections to the company©s plan. Even corporate insinuations that
the union might not act in their members© best interests in this matter
were allowed to pass without union comment.
In July 1981, the company proposal was presented by union leaders
to their constituency. In the process, however, the company©s package
was presented to union members in pieces. This approach allowed union
members to ratify some, but not all, corporate proposals. Management
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was angry with the union leaderships© tactics of presentation. It was
management©s view that union negotiators used these tactics in order
to get back to the bargaining table, so management reasserted its con
trol over the bargaining process. About two weeks after partial ratifica
tion of the company©s proposals, Timkin stated that union leaders must
secure ratification of the company package, in its entirety, or another
site would be chosen.
A ballot on the entire package was scheduled for October 11, 1981.
Again, union leadership, who had not participated in shaping the
package, refused to make any recommendation. Union members nar
rowly rejected it. The local president attributed this result to strong
employee opposition to an 11-year contract and elimination of the in
centive premium. Any incentive premium concession represented both
a loss of income and a loss of face for union negotiators because the
company had been trying to eliminate the incentive premium for years.
An outside source also asserted that the union leaders made no real ef
fort to explain the company©s offer or the potential benefits. He also
indicated that the date of October 11 coincided with the Pittsburgh
Steelers-Cleveland Browns football game, a scheduling that assured a
very low voter turnout.
The second round began almost immediately. Once rejection of the
company plan was confirmed, the company mounted a new, intensive
strategy to gain worker accceptance of corporate proposals, and out
side forces began to assert pressure on both negotiating parties. Manage
ment, apparently believing the union©s persuasion efforts had been in
adequate, initiated direct communications with their employees. Infor
mation pamphlets were mailed out, question and answer hotlines were
activated, newspaper informational ads were published and radio talks
on the steel mill proposal were encouraged by management. Further
more, the corporation©s historic and prominent role in the community
prompted the city©s mayor to become involved in the steel mill issue.
According to the local president, the mayor©s participation was critical
in maintaining negotiation efforts between the two parties. Without him,
the formal distance between the parties may have prevented a resump
tion of negotiations.
The central message in all of the company©s communication efforts
was designed to have an impact on union members, their families and
the company in general. According to the company, a new steel mill
in the area would provide continued job security for current workers
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and generate desirable employment opportunities for other members
of the community.
The company©s proposal was again presented to union members for
a vote. In addition to community pressure and the company©s major
communications effort, the company had removed the incentive premium
issue from the bargaining table. They agreed to allow existing premium
issues to be determined in arbitration. Finally, in a side letter to the
international representative, the company agreed that if the package were
ratified, they would build the plant at the local site. While it is unclear
which of the company©s actions influenced the workers most significant
ly, the combined impact of the above-mentioned events led to a union
member ratification of the company©s package by a 10-to-l ratio. By
mid-1982, the plant was under construction.

Contributing Factors
A number of factors may have had a significant bearing on the negotia
tions for the new steel plant. First, and possibly foremost, it appears
that the company perceives a local location as advantageous. Because
they want a high degree of corporate control over operations, manage
ment favored a steel mill site located near corporate headquarters.
Moreover, the company has great influence within the community, as
was illustrated by the union president©s statement, "The Corporation
owns the town." Community leaders are likely to be more responsive
here to the needs of the company than in other cities.
The local union does not have a history of "bucking the company."
The corporation is, and historically has been, tough on the issue of
management rights. Union members appear to have generally accepted
the company©s dominant role. The last major strike occurred in 1968.
A brief 1986 strike did not affect the new mill. The company has also
experienced a low level of grievances and arbitration.
Moreover, there was some lack of harmony within the union bargain
ing team. Lack of internal union cohesiveness allowed the company
to assume a leadership position in the bargaining process. Divided union
leadership also allowed the company to mobilize its forces effectively
to influence union members directly and to mount an effective public
relations program without an effective countervailing union effort.
By contrast, management©s structure and policies enhanced internal
consonance. Family members own and operate the company, leaving
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them relatively free to develop their bargaining position with little out
side interference. Presidents of the company have been knowledgeable
on labor relations matters and have, over the years, played major roles
in labor negotiations. Even though the president did not sit in negotia
tions for the new mill, the union was well aware of his behind-the-scene
role.
Finally, it is clear that community leaders wanted the new steel mill
to be built in the area. While local city leaders never explicitly stated
as much, they may have presented the community with a perception
that "a vote against the company©s proposal is a vote against the com
munity." At the very least, the community believed its economic future
was linked to the corporation©s prosperity.

Final Outcome
The agreement between the two parties, effective November 1981,
reflected the bargaining strength of the company. Wages and condi
tions of employment were positive from a managerial point of view.
The contractual provision allowing the company complete hiring discre
tion was also significant. At will, management was free to obtain new
steel mill employees from internal or external labor pools. A two-tiered
wage settlement was negotiated so that new employees would receive
a lower rate of compensation than current employees in comparable
positions in both the old mill and the new one.
The company also obtained a favorable agreement concerning con
tract length and contract renewal conditons for the new plant. The
original contract would be in operation for three years. Prior to the end
of the three-year period, either party could indicate a desire to renegotiate
the terms of the contract. If new terms could not be mutually agreed
upon, the contract in its original form would be automatically renewed
for another three-year period. Two renewals of this nature would be
allowed. In other words, the company was assured that no strike would
occur at the new plant for this entire period. (The agreement for the
existing plant was not subject to the same automatic renewal provisions.)
After this nine-year period, the existing plant and the new steel mill
would jointly negotiate a contract. Even at this point, the company re
tained a written understanding that the new plant©s agreement might
contain additional unique provisions.

Securing the Future 87

Included in the initial contract were provisions allowing for con
siderable managerial flexibility in job assignments, grievance process
ing and layoffs during the mill "construction period" (considered to
extend three years past the first production of steel). For example, dur
ing this rather lengthy time period, the union would not be permitted
to grieve any corporate action related to: (1) hiring or layoff of new
employees, (2) selection, assignment, and qualifications of employees,
whether newly hired or transferred, (3) the work to be performed, and
(4) the return of employees to their previous occupations.
Seniority rights, incentive plans and numerous other wage and working
conditions were also considerably reduced or designed to allow for a
high degree of managerial flexibility. Furthermore, each contract pro
vision could remain in place through three contract periods, should
management choose not to agree to a contractual change proposed by
the union.
Inferences
The relative power of the company in these negotiations is clear, but
it is not readily apparent why the union constituency was so overwhelm
ingly persuaded to the company©s position. Skepticism concerning both
the company©s intentions to locate elsewhere and its genuine need for
concessions was expressed at both the leader and rank-and-file levels.
Some appreciation of the temporal and spatial context might be helpful.
At the time of negotiations, plant closings had caused the international
representative in this case to have lost more than half his membership.
Local workers were clearly aware of these circumstances. No matter
how small the risk of losing the plant, no one on the union side was
inclined to take it.
Furthermore, Timkin is not generally regarded by its employees with
the same negative passion that is expressed by some militant workers
and union leaders. The local president himself expressed the view at
several points during the interview that the corporation is a good place
to work. This unusually high degree of trust in management (not because
the company is regarded as benevolent, but because the managers are
perceived as good businessmen) probably accounts for the overwhelm
ing vote on the company proposal.
Whether the company©s willingness to return to negotiations after the
initial rejection points to patience in dealing with the union, or simply
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points to the absence of any intent to consider alternative locations will
never be known. In any event, in this case where the company©s demands
were primarily directed at an unknown group of employees (the
workforce of the new mill), where the temporal and spatial environ
ment favored easy ratification, and where a history of cooperative union
reponse to management prevailed, the negotiations were not easy.
Conclusion
Air Spring and Timkin vividly illustrate the time frame relevant for
a discussion of plant closure. For a union representative, no time is
too early to think about the factors that cause plants to close. Since every
plant will eventually close, it is essential to secure new investment, on
site or nearby, that will assure job security for union members.
Knowledge or information about corporate plans is, of course, the
sine qua non for success in securing new plants. In Air Spring, such
information appears to have been obtained fortuitously. The quality of
the local union president©s relationship with management representatives
who could tell him about the corporation©s Air Spring plans cannot be
ignored, however. Had the relationship been strained, it is unlikely the
information would have been exchanged.
At Timkin, the company initiated the dialogue for several apparent
reasons. It wanted to locate the new mill in the Canton area; it saw
that the agreement revisions it needed to operate the plant efficiently
would not be terribly onerous to the steelworkers union; and it recognized
that in the economic climate of 1980-81, when nearly half the steel worker
jobs in the area, including nearly all of them in Youngstown, had been
eliminated, it could approach these negotiations from a position of power.
Union negotiators in both cases were prepared to discuss inducements
they might offer in the form of agreement modifications. The companies
had alternatives with respect to plant location. Key union negotiators
knew it, and feared that an alternative to Northeast Ohio might be selected
for the new plant. Perhaps even more important, both unions had ex
perienced job loss due to plant closure so that job security had greater
priority than it might otherwise have had in earlier times.
Finally, the union negotiators in both cases were able to agree because
rank-and-file resistance to company demands was not organized or
significant. At Timkin, the key issue was an incentive pay plan that
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the company wanted to remove, not only at the new mill but in the old
one as well. Once this issue was withdrawn by the company, at least
insofar as the old mill was concerned, the agreement was overwhelm
ingly ratified.
Perhaps the most difficult element in negotiations of this type is the
fact that existing employees, and their representatives, do not necessarily
see that the location of a new plant nearby is worth anything to them.
In fairness, recognition of a tragedy scenario like Truck Components
is difficult without hindsight. Why should existing workers, with some
seniority, give up favorable terms of employment when there is no im
mediate tangible benefit? Only if the new plant is seen by the employees
as insurance against the tragedy scenario will they be willing to "pay"
for it. Even in the cases included here, it is not clear that the typical
rank-and-file voter saw the ratification of agreement changes in that light.
Union negotiators have a twofold task in such situations. First, they
must be assured, themselves, that there is an "insurance" payoff for
their members. Not all new plants will assure the development of jobs
of comparable quality or that their existing members will be in line to
obtain the jobs. Then, leaders must educate members with respect to
the quid pro quo. Employers cannot be expected to give up tangible
benefits for an intangible promise. The general economic climate of
Northeast Ohio, as well as the industries involved, helped secure the
new plants in these cases. When the circumstances are less favorable
to rank-and-file acceptance, union leaders will have a more difficult task.

NOTE
1. The name of the corporation has been withheld at the request of the company.

5
Findings and Conclusions
Some Private and Public Alternatives

Although it is difficult and possibly misleading to draw broad, general
conclusions out of a handful of case studies, the usefulness of a project
such as this would be limited without such an attempt. Readers are,
of course, free to draw their own conclusions based on the principal
findings summarized below.
General Findings and Conclusions

Why Plants Close
When viewed from a short run perspective, it is clear that market
conditions drive bonafide plant closure negotiations. If market forces
are strong enough, there is no hope for saving a plant. All three cases
of chapter 2 Blue Water Seafood, Custom Lumber Products, and Truck
Components illustrate this.
In the case of Custom Lumber Products, a sudden change in the market
for complementary factors of production, namely, transportation costs,
caused the plant to become unprofitable. Its continued operation could
not be justified. Truck Components and Blue Water Seafood closed
because of changes in the market for the product produced. For Blue
Water Seafood, consumer preference shifted away from the products.
At Truck Components, the introduction of competitive suppliers into
the marketplace from Japan had a devastating effect. Corporate market
share was drastically reduced and consolidation of its production into
more efficient facilities was necessary.
A common characteristic of all three cases was the narrow range of
products being produced and the absence of new products or produc
tion technology that might have kept the plant competitive. In two of
the three cases, the facilities were less than 15 years old at the time
of closure; so an obsolete plant, in itself, was not a factor in their closure.
91
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It would be inappropriate to conclude that the absence of new products
or new technology always leads to plant closure in the short run or,
conversely, that their introduction always saves plants. It seems
reasonable to conclude though, that product diversity and new technology
do enhance a plant©s life expectancy.
High labor costs or a poor labor climate were not blamed by manage
ment for the closure of any of the three plants discussed in chapter 2.
This is not to say that labor climate was irrelevant. In fact, with respect
to Truck Components, which was a victim of the "tragedy scenario,"
the poor labor climate and high labor costs of the 1950s were what led
directly to the corporation©s decision to invest in plants in other parts
of the country. Without realizing it at the time, the corporation placed
the future of the Cleveland Truck Components plant in jeopardy when
these new plants were built elsewhere. At all three plants discussed in
chapter 2, a better labor climate might have encouraged investment in
new technologies or new product lines at the Cleveland plants, so that
when the product market in one line failed, others would have been
there to absorb the shock.
One might argue that although the preceding conclusion is reasonable,
it has doubtful value. Neither unions nor management had much con
cern for labor climate in the 1950s. Why concern ourselves with spill
ed milk? Even though some unions were willing to make concessions
at the time closures were announced in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
the opportunities for improving the labor climate and unit labor cost
pattern had long passed.
On the other hand, there is an apparent lesson for surviving managers,
employees, and unions: pressure must be continually applied to bring
new products and new technologies into an existing plant. Products and
plants have a finite "life cycle." As those from the marketing field will
attest, a product life cycle can be extended by various means. It seems
clear from this study that intervention will also have an effect on "plant
life cycles" as well. Constant attention to the labor climate as well as
corporate investment decisions would undoubtedly have an impact on
the life expectancy of a plant. Such a finding is consistent with that of
Anil Verma that unions have no choice but to negotiate for more new
investment. 1
Can Plants be Saved Through Negotiations?
A second conclusion that seems justified on the basis of the four cases
in chapter 3 is that where the threat to the plant©s survival stems, in
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part, from high unit labor costs, collective bargaining can be an effec
tive way to address the situation. The cases demonstrate that a poor
industrial relations climate can be changed, and that by changing such
a climate plants can be saved from premature closure. Just as death
can be held off by timely medical treatment, so too can plants be sav
ed, at least for a time, with joint problem solving, provided both par
ties genuinely desire a nonfatal solution and discover the problem ear
ly enough to take effective action.
A third conclusion, also apparent from the cases in this study,is that
various constraints and preconditions for negotiations which are im
bedded in the collective bargaining relationship affect the probability
of success in reversing the drift toward plant closure. Personal
characteristics or aspirations, interpersonal relationships, mutual trust
and respect, among others, all seem to have potential to influence the
outcome. Although this study has recognized that the economic environ
ment is crucial for determining the range of possible outcomes for any
particular plant, its focus has been on the impact "institutional elements"
have on the success of plant saving negotiations. The research ques
tions posed in chapter 1 help to frame an outline for the following
discussion.
Further Elaboration on the
Plant Closing Negotiations Model
1. How do unions know when the employer©s threat to close is bona
fide? In every case investigated for this study, including those of chapter
2 where the plants were closed, the employer has been willing to discuss
candidly the financial circumstances of the particular facility. For some
union officials, the accounting data were significant and had an effect
on their conclusions concerning the operation of the facility. Many union
representatives, as well as their constituents, however, were not per
suaded by "the data." Their view was that accounting practices are
so sophisticated, and accounting standards are sufficiently nebulous in
areas such as cost accounting, that even professional financial analysts
might differ with respect to the basic financial condition of a particular
operation.
Moreover, an accurate conclusion with respect to the financial per
formance of an operation may not be the critical indicator anyway. Even
profitable operations are sometimes closed when profit rates do not meet
corporate minimum expectations or simply because of corporate deci-
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sions to "downsize" in response to market changes. The underlying
question is whether a facility fits into overall corporate plans in the short
to intermediate term of two to five years. The answer may depend on
a variety of factors related to the facility©s financial performance, but
is not determined by it.
Rather than financial performance, the more critical indicators of
management©s intentions relate to maintenance and housekeeping, new
product and technology innovation in a facility, and the status of the
stock on the shelves. In the words of one union representative, "If
employees in the plant just open their eyes, they can tell whether their
plant is in trouble."
In some cases, considerable effort was made to persuade union leaders
that management truly intended to close the plant unless changes were
made. The more difficult educational challenge, however, was that faced
by union leaders when they confronted their members. In larger facilities,
even though key leaders were convinced the threat was bona fide, a
substantial segment of the rank and file was not convinced. As noted
in the case of Auto Parts, most of the bargaining committee was suffi
ciently ambivalent that they refused to take a position on the work rules
concession package. In addition, more radical political activists ac
cused the local president of being the "concession king" and implied
that he was betraying the interests of the rank and file. Such a difference
of opinion among those who are closest to the situation and who have
the most at stake suggests that there is no reliable way to determine
whether an employer threat to close is bona fide or not. In smaller
facilities, the problem was not as severe apparently because members
had the same exposure to information and other indicators of the com
pany©s condition as their leaders had.
2. Why does an employer initiate discussions ? There have been NLRB
and court decisions relating to the employer©s obligation to bargain in
the context of plant closing. 2 Based on managerial interviewees© reports
for this project, however, legal pressure was not a significant factor
in management©s desire to discuss potential plant closing in any of the
cases studied.
One surprising finding was that employers tend not to be dissuaded
from attempting negotiations with a union concerning the preservation
of a plant when there has been a history of difficult labor-management
relations. The history of the relationship may be important in deter
mining how the employer approaches these negotiations, though. In the
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context of difficult labor-management relations, employers tend to
assume more rigid "take it or leave it" attitudes. Typical among those
following such a pattern was the Auto Parts plant. Even where manage
ment opens with a firm position, however, such as in the case of Ohio
Rubber, where a two-dollar cut in labor costs was demanded, negotia
tions typically lead to compromise.
In a case where plant closure was not explicitly raised as an issue
by management, Wrapping Materials, there was no attempt by manage
ment to conceal its intentions with respect to the plant. In fact, manage
ment revealed its long-term corporate investment program to a meeting
of the employees in that plant and it was that corporate investment pro
gram presentation that led to discussions between the plant manager
and the union.
Even in Blue Water Seafood, where there was no significant discus
sion with the union concerning keeping the plant open, the absence of
discussion was not due to any attempt by management to keep the union
in the dark. Management indicated to the union that such discussions
would be fruitless in light of its product market analysis which had
nothing to do with labor costs or climate.
The employer who raises the issue of possible plant closing for discus
sion seems to do so when several critical factors are present. Perhaps
most important, the employer must believe there is a realistic possibili
ty of achieving sufficient labor cost savings to justify maintaining the
facility. Negotiations to achieve contract modification are typically long
and difficult. Despite the perceptions of some union representatives and
employees to the contrary, it is unlikely that an employer engages in
concession bargaining in order to reduce labor costs for the short runbetween the time of such concessions and ultimate closure.
The Truck Components case is one in which the employees and their
union leaders expressed special cynicism with regard to management©s
motives. In that case, after long negotiations, contract modifications
were introduced in order to save the Truck Components plant. After
the parties reached a settlement, the market for Truck Components©
products further deteriorated to the point where the corporation could
not justify keeping the plant open. The employees expressed the view
that management©s motives from the beginning were suspect. It is clear,
however, that the investment in the negotiations as well as the costs
incurred by management to finance the job guarantees after closure,
were substantial and could have been avoided if management had not
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undertaken negotiations at all. The Truck Components case is one where
management incorrectly anticipated the state of the market for its pro
duct. It is apparent from this study that when management reaches a
decision to close a facility, it does so without raising the question of
concessions with the union. The case of Blue Water Seafood illustrates
this.
Another important factor that motivates management to raise the ques
tion of plant closure in a timely fashion is the commitment of local
management to the community in which the plant is located.This fac
tor is difficult to measure and easy to miss in any study of plant closure.
It is easy to discount statements by managers that they have a concern
for the well-being of long-term employees at a plant, but the evidence
in this study suggests that such concern is a factor which affects the
effort they are willing to invest in negotiations. Commitment to the com
munity is not altogether altruistic because the managers, themselves,
live in the community and are often closely attached to it. In all but
one of the nine cases reported in this study, top local management
reported that they identified Northeast Ohio as their home. None of
them was looking forward to a transfer to some other location if the
plant were to close. In other words, there was more than a "corporate
interest" from the management side to save the facility.
3. What factors influence the union response? In the cases selected
for study in this project, negotiations to save plants actually occurred
or the union was prepared to engage in such negotiations. Hence, these
cases represent only a "tail of the distribution" and are not represen
tative of all plant closing situations. Even so, the responses of the unions
varied considerably across cases and over time within cases.
For example, in the case of Cleveland Twist Drill, the union©s initial
response to the demands made by management to forestall closing were
essentially negative. Cleveland Twist Drill is instructive because it
represents a case where the employees and the union had been exposed
to a number of "facts" that should have convinced them that manage
ment was not bluffing. By the time management approached the union
for discussions on contract modifications, nearly half of the exempt
workforce had been terminated and the union was aware that manage
ment had begun the process of expanding production in other locations
outside of Cleveland.
In the case of Auto Parts, the local union president favored negotiating
and modifying the contract on the terms specified by management, but
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all of the other members of the union©s bargaining team opposed this
move by the union. This was in spite of their knowledge that manage
ment had excess capacity and that profitability had been eroded substan
tially because of Japanese imports.
At the other extreme, the union in Wrapping Materials was willing
to participate in contract discussions from the time the matter was first
raised by management, and to do so in a flexible way. At Ohio Rub
ber, the pattern was "mixed." That is, the local union president agreed
to discussions with the company concerning contract modifications,
especially when it was possible that work could be moved back into
the plant from a southern location, but when the matter was to be brought
before the local union membership for discussion and a vote, the presi
dent was reluctant to pursue the matter.
The single ingredient that seems most important in explaining these
variations in union leader behavior is "politics." Where union leaders
are politically secure, or where they have little regard for their political
futures, they seem to be more willing to engage in aggressive discus
sions with management and to take the lead with respect to proposing
changes to their membership. Although with hindsight it is possible to
conclude that the leaders in most of the cases made popular decisions
with respect to contract modifications and plant preservation, they did
not have the advantage of such hindsight at the time they engaged in
their negotiations. The membership element has been noted elsewhere.
Thomas W. Miner, vice-president for labor relations at Chrysler, noted
with respect to 1982 negotiations, "Industry©s problems at the bargaining
table are not now with union leadership, but with rank and file." 3 Anyone
facing plant closure threats must recognize this factor and its influence.
Another factor that appears important is the degree to which the union
leaders and their constituents share a cynical attitude toward manage
ment. At the initial stages of negotiations, an attitude among the rank
and file, and in some cases among the leadership, is that management©s
sole intention is to "screw the workers." Those who shared this at
titude tended to see labor-management negotiations very narrowly as
a game in which one side attempts to inflict as much pain and suffering
on the other as possible. With that attitude, the question of plant closure
was not seen as having the significance that it deserved. It was just one
more way that management could attempt to manipulate its bargaining
power relative to the union. From this perspective, the response on the
union side was naturally to resist any proposals by management and,
as much as possible, "to take them down with us when we go."
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Such an attitude was not prevalent among the cases we studied,
although it clearly plays some role in almost any plant closing negotia
tion situation. It has to be overcome with appeals to the economic selfinterest of the individual workers or it is likely to lead to plant closure.
An alternative for unions when they are confronted with a potential
plant closing situation is to turn to third party political action in order
to forestall the closing or to apply pressure to the company to recon
sider its decision. This kind of action is typical in Europe, as has been
noted elsewhere. 4 In this study, there were no cases in which a union
attempted to use third party political pressure as a weapon against
management. Rather, the union at Cleveland Twist Drill used the political
connections it had in order to obtain information and to gather a clearer
understanding of the factual situation it faced. Perhaps the most
sophisticated use of third party political clout came in the case of Wrap
ping Materials where the district director of the union worked with the
mayor, county leaders, state legislators, and members of Congress to
obtain funding and other necessary political decisions that permitted
investment to take place. Governmental action to assist in the invest
ment decision there was probably as important as the modification to
the labor agreement in the preservation of that plant.
In summary, the political circumstances and aspirations of the union
leadership play a significant role in the union©s response to an initiative
on the part of management to close a plant or to discuss a potential plant
closure. Next in importance is the general attitude of the rank and file,
or a significant minority within it, toward management and the collec
tive bargaining process. Only where employees see their own economic
self-interest as paramount are negotiations likely to proceed effective
ly. Finally, although they are not an essential element in saving plants,
the external political forces that unions can bring to bear can be helpful.
At least they were so here, where they were used in a conciliatory way
to help overcome the problems faced by management as well as the
union.
4. What are the distinguishing characteristics of successful negotia
tions? Two of the important ingredients for success have already been
discussed. Union leaders, and their constituents, must have access to
the facts, and the capacity to understand the economic reality faced by
their plant, or the objectives of management with respect to their plant,
so that they can negotiate over modifications in contract terms from
a realistic position. Second, union leaders must be in politically stable
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positions so they can act as industrial statesmen rather than political
opportunists.
A third ingredient for success relates to an area only briefly discuss
ed to this point. Union leaders must recognize and take advantage of
all the options available to them during plant saving negotiations over
contract modifications. The most important issue in plant closing negotia
tions is job security. In many instances, union leaders are tempted to
demand job guarantees, severance pay, or mandatory minimum advance
notice of plant shut down. It is not at all clear that these are the demands,
even when won, that really protect plants and jobs.
Managerial concessions that insure investment in new technology and
new products for the plant are the ones that save plants. There are legal
issues here which complicate the matter. Clearly, negotiation concern
ing investment, product mix, and similar matters are beyond the scope
of mandatory issues under the law. 5 Yet, company decisions regarding
these matters determine the job security of the employees. In every case
in this study where plants have remained open, management has made
the commitment to increase investment in the plant or to return jobs
to the plant that they had previously located elsewhere or contracted out.
It is clear that union leaders play a crucial role in the question of
whether negotiations will be successful, but management has an equal
ly important part to play. With respect to information, management has
the capacity to enlighten or to obfuscate with respect to the facts of the
matter. To the extent that management chooses the latter course, it is
impossible to create the enlightenment necessary on the part of union
leaders or their constituents that is critical for the success of negotia
tions. With respect to the political ingredient, management has the poten
tial to mislead the "industrial statesman" union leader, to embarrass
such a leader after he has taken the risk to make contract modifications,
and so to undermine him that his successor "knows better" than ever
to trust management again. No matter what the rationale for the U.S.
Steel©s purchase of Marathon Oil after the Steel workers agreed to con
cessions, the union leaders and their members felt duped. The political
embarrassment has clearly led union leaders to make statements and
to take positions that might otherwise be considered irrational.
In all four successful cases investigated for this study, management
followed through, in letter and, more important, in spirit, with respect
to commitments they made at the bargaining table. At Cleveland Twist
Drill, the company increased the number of jobs beyond any agree-
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ment to do so. At Auto Parts, the company has increased beyond its
commitments both the number of jobs and the investment in new tools
and equipment. Such moves by management clearly reinforce the deci
sions made by the industrial statesman union leader when the contract
modifications were agreed upon. They also make it possible for other
industrial statesmen to emerge.
Finally, the willingness of management to discuss nonmandatory issues
at the bargaining table enables union leaders to negotiate for terms that
provide true job security more investment in technology and new pro
ducts for the plant. Management©s reactions to union demands for in
creased investment will help existing employees to see that their own
job security is a function of company growth at their location.

Private Policy Alternatives
The findings of this study have implications for both policy and
strategic planning on the question of plant closing. This section deals
first with the decision model and factors that might be considered in
an employer decision concerning the closure of a plant. It then con
siders the strategies that are likely to be most useful from a union
standpoint.

An Employer Decision Model
When an employer considers closing a plant, it may be motivated
by a desire to reduce overall production or a decision to move the pro
duction to what the employer believes is a more efficient location
elsewhere. Such a decision to move may be the result of an earlier deci
sion to reduce overall production which, in turn, caused capacity utiliza
tion in a number of different facilities to become less than optimal. Con
solidation of production into a smaller number of locations, sometimes
called "rationalization," promises more efficient operations.
A decision to move production may also be motivated by the pro
mise of a better labor climate including lower labor costs. Even where
a decision to move production to another location and close a Cleveland
facility was motivated solely by desire to consolidate, the alternative
of closing the distant location and retaining the Cleveland site is also
a possible alternative one that would presumably be considered if the
labor climate or labor cost picture in Cleveland were bright. 6
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As noted in the earlier part of this chapter, a decision to close based
on an immediate need to reduce production is irreversible, regardless
of union response. Blue Water Seafood illustrated such a situation. When
closure is the result of consolidation or rationalization of production
into more productive facilities after production levels have been reduc
ed, e.g. Truck Components, no union response is likely to be effective
either. In both of these cases, market conditions overwhelm any con
sideration that might be given to labor climate. When closure is con
sidered specifically because of a poor labor climate or where two facilities
are similar with respect to "technical considerations," i.e., they are
technologically comparable and have similar proximity to customers
and suppliers, a change in labor climate would likely have an impact
on the decision to close.
The following discussion relates to cases where labor climate is rele
vant. In that context, there appear to be three dimensions to a managerial
decision concerning the closure of a particular facility. These are capital
investment, continuing operating costs, and noneconomic considerations.
Capital Investment. Ordinarily a decision to relocate production, either
by moving to avoid a poor labor climate or to consolidate into a more
efficient location, involves capital investment. In the case of Truck Com
ponents, this factor was a key element in the local plant manager©s
strategy to save his plant. In addition to the actual cost of moving tools
and equipment to a new location, there is the cost of preparing a receiving
site. There may also be severance pay benefits to employees at the site
being closed as well as contractual commitments to suppliers at the ex
isting site.
Such capital investments must be amortized over a period of time.
In most companies, a rational decision on whether to move production
would be subject to the same constraints as any other capital invest
ment decision. That is, the investment in a move would have to meet
corporate threshold payback or return on investment (ROI) criteria.
Payback or return on investment would be measured in terms of the
savings that flow from continuing operations after the move has been
made versus the costs of continued operations at the existing location.
These savings are, of course, estimated prior to a move and subject
to uncertainty.
An alternative capital investment for the company might be the ex
penditure of executive time to negotiate with the union to improve the
labor climate and reduce labor costs in the existing location. This is
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the approach Truck Components attempted to use. Such an investment
might be substantial in order to assure success. It is also made at some
risk because it is difficult to determine in advance that a substantial ex
penditure of executive time and talent will yield a lower cost labor
climate. In any event it may be possible to compare the capital invest
ment of moving versus the investment by management in creating a
new labor climate at the existing location. It is conceivable that the lat
ter will reflect lower overall cost for the corporation than the former,
so that if comparable cost savings can be attained by either means, an
investment in improving the labor climate may be the better choice.
The same analysis also applies to a decision where outright closure
rather than a move is contemplated. That is, there may be situations
where the "exit cost" to the firm of a shutdown is greater than the re
quired investment to improve labor climate to a level where continued
operations produce profits in excess of threshold ROI.
Operating Costs. The savings that flow from a lower per unit operating
cost at a new or consolidated location are the returns to an investment
that might justify a move. In many cases, it is possible to identify a
more efficient location than the existing plant. Simply identifying a more
efficient location is not adequate to justify a move, however. The dif
ference in savings must be sufficient to pay back the capital investment
(with interest) that is necessary to finance the move. An accurate estimate
of capital investment necessary to finance a move is possible. The estima
tion of continuing operating costs at the new location is more difficult.
Unless a company already has experience in a given market with both
the quality and cost of labor, it is difficult to know what the nature of
the labor market will be in the new location.
It is, of course, necessary to compare the projected costs at the new
location with estimated costs at the existing location after an invest
ment in improving the labor climate has been made. It may well be
that the operating costs at the new location would be no lower than they
might be at the existing location after such an investment in improving
the labor climate has been made.
Noneconomic Considerations. Although the above analysis implicit
ly includes among the capital and operating costs the time spent by
management in labor-management relations and improving the labor
climate, there are elements that cannot be included in the economic
analysis. Among these are the personal preferences of management for
a location in which to live. In general, this study has found that such
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preferences work to the advantage of a decision to maintain a local facility
rather than close and move to a new location. There are, of course,
examples to the contrary where local Cleveland companies have been
relocated to the Sunbelt apparently at the insistence of top management
who had a preference to move to the new location. There are also ex
ternal political considerations that have motivated company relocation.
Where a political climate is not conducive to local corporate interests,
there may be an inclination to move.
Finally, the preference of some employers to avoid dealing with unions
"at any cost" must also be taken into consideration. Some employers
have a nonrational (from an economic standpoint) view that managing
without unions is always preferable to managing with them. Under
such circumstances, a decision to move for the purpose of avoiding
unions cannot be overcome by investment in improving the labor climate.
Several Cleveland corporations, including one company that was in
cluded in this study, have expressed an explicit policy of investing on
ly in new locations where unions can be avoided. This is not to say
that they are specifically engaging in the tactic of the "runaway shop,"
but it is implicit, pursuant to the tragedy scenario, that such a policy
would lead to the loss of plants in the Cleveland area as production ra
tionalization occurs into newer more efficient facilities outside of the
Cleveland area. 7
Union Policy
A union©s response to threatened plant closure appears to be the result,
in part, of the general perception its leadership holds with respect to
the commercial/industrial world. A number of interviewees, particularly
the dissident, more radical union leaders who were interviewed in this
project, expressed a view of management that was cynical and negative.
It was their view that management success depended entirely on the
extent to which employees could be exploited. This perception of
management led union leaders to think of negotiations in the context
of a threatened closure as entirely distributive. Another element of this
view is that so-called plant saving negotiations have nothing to do with
saving plants. That is, employers engage in such negotiations to exact
concessions from the workforce either to reduce the costs of operating
a plant already targeted for closure or to bluff a union into accepting
long-term labor cost cuts at a facility that would continue in operation
in any event.
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The tactical position of labor negotiators who held such views was
to resist any form of contract modification at the bargaining table. Un
fortunately, where management has made a bona fide threat to close
a facility, and the possibility for saving it is tied directly to labor cost
and climate considerations, such a tactical position is fatal.
An alternative view among a much larger group of labor negotiators
was that management merely acts opportunistically in the context of
difficult economic times. Their view was that management faced alter
native production location decisions and made them on the basis of
relative costs. For these negotiators, the tactical position was altogether
different. The key question was at what labor cost level would manage
ment actually close the facility or retain it. The answer to some of these
questions was obviously difficult to obtain since management was not
altogether clear in its own mind on this issue in some of the negotia
tions, especially where the state of the product market was uncertain.
Moreover, such labor negotiators were also faced with the question of
what level of wages and benefits their membership would ratify.
To varying degrees, the labor negotiators who fit this model might
be referred to as "industrial statesmen." They tended to be less oppor
tunistic themselves with respect to the political environment within their
unions. They were not necessarily altruistic in their views, but recognized
that the long-run interests of their union and themselves lay in a careful
investigation of the position management was taking at the bargaining
table. The action model employed by these pragmatic labor leaders was
to seek more information and ultimately to attain commitments from
management that would assure job security for their members through
greater investment or the introduction of new products in the plants that
were threatened with closure.
When to Talk About Saving Plants. McKersie8 has concluded that union
consultation (meaning access, influence and involvement) at top cor
porate levels was a necessary ingredient for saving plants. That is, unless
unions are allowed access to the "strategic" level of corporate decisionmaking, there is little hope they can influence plant closing decisions.
This study is consistent with McKersie©s conclusions so long as a broad
definition of "access" is employed. Unions obtained access in numerous
ways in these cases, but typically through local management. Initial
discussions regarding future corporate plans occurred at that level. Only
subsequently, with encouragement and support from local management,
were the unions able to access top management. Possible exceptions
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to this conclusion were Air Spring and Timkin, where new plant loca
tion decisions were involved, but also where top corporate management
was located in the same community as local union leadership. It is not
clear which of these factors led Air Spring and Timkin to be excep
tional cases.
Power vs. Reason. Power in a bargaining relationship is the ability
to impose costs on the other party. The irony in plant closing negotia
tions is that the exercise of power by a union is almost sure to be fatal.
Power is the means to obtain the attention of top management,
however. The ability to drive up the cost of moving work or, perhaps
more important, to lower the cost of retaining a plant, causes top manage
ment to listen more intently to what a union has to say. Ultimately,
economic reason must drive any plant closing decision, however, so
union negotiators must be prepared to rely on it once they come to the
bargaining table.
Public Policy Implications

The American model of union-management relations has been
characterized as "legalistic" relative to most other industrial relations
systems in developed economies. Since the Wagner Act was passed in
1935, the parties have relied on the government to define the nature
of their relationship. This has been especially true with respect to the
scope of bargaining the range of subjects about which the parties are
obligated to negotiate. Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) obligated employers to negotiate only with respect to "wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." By mutual agree
ment other issues could be negotiated, but employers were not obligated
to negotiate with respect to them, and unions were forbidden to apply
coercive economic pressure, e.g., the strike, to press their demands
in these areas. In general, corporate investment decisions, decisions
to open or close plants, and related "strategic" managerial issues are
not mandatory subjects of bargaining. 9 This study suggests that the poten
tial for saving plants through negotiations might be enhanced if national
labor policy was modified with respect to plant closing and, more im
portant, investment decisions.

Plant Closure
At the present time, the law provides only that an employer must
negotiate the impact of a closure, not the closure itself, unless the closure
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decision "turns on" labor costs (the "Otis Elevator rule"). Even though
such "effects" bargaining obligations may require some notice of the
closing decision, 10 it does not require the same advance warning that
a "decision" bargaining right would require."
Moreover, the Otis Elevator rule may be difficult to interpret and
enforce because it requires a determination of motive, i.e., that the
employer decision turns on labor costs, before the obligation to bargain
is clear. As noted throughout the cases analyzed in this study, the deci
sion to close is almost always related to profitability. Labor cost is one
element in such a calculation. From an economic viewpoint, to say that
a decision is based on other elements determining profitability, but not
on labor costs, would be equivalent to arguing that the upper blade of
the proverbial scissors cuts while the bottom one does not.
A more productive line of reasoning for the adjudication of this issue
would flow from the Supreme Court©s rule in National Woodwork
Manufacturer©s Association v. NLRB (386 US 612, 1967), i.e., that work
preservation and job security go to the heart of a union©s raison d©etre,
thus matters relating to such issues are mandatory. From such a con
clusion, one could argue that any plant closure decision is mandatory.
From a pragmatic standpoint, if public policy is intended to facilitate
saving plants and jobs, this study supports the idea that demands for
contractual rules relating to plant closure should be mandatory. For
successful negotiations to occur with respect to saving a plant, a union
must have some timely notice that a decision to close is under considera
tion. None of the evidence collected for this study suggests that such
prior notice to the union, where it has been negotiated into the labor
agreement, has been burdensome to the employer. Further study of the
use of voluntarily negotiated plant closure notice and its impact on the
potential for saving jobs should be undertaken.
In the absence of such studies, it seems apparent from this study that
public policy should encourage the negotiation of notice requirements
and the opportunity for the union to have an impact on decisions to close
plants before such decisions are made. It is not at all clear that such
a right for the union can be effectively legislated, but bilateral negotia
tion of such union rights would have more likelihood for success in
the American context. To that end, plant closure clauses, including union
demands for advance notice or a right to present alternatives, should
be mandatory issues of bargaining. Of course, since the duty to bargain
under the NLRA does not require the employer to agree, such a policy
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would not require employer concessions where the employer believed
such concessions would cause serious harm to its ability to operate.
Investment Decisions
As noted above, decisions by the company with respect to invest
ment in new plant or equipment currently are beyond the purview of
the mandatory list of subjects for collective bargaining under the NLRA.
Investment decisions may be voluntarily negotiated, of course, and, as
discussed below, this study illustrates that. The proposal here is parallel
with that concerning plant closing. The proposal is not that all invest
ment decisions should be mandatory subjects of bargaining. Rather, a
union demand for a contract clause concerning investment should be
a mandatory issue. The parties would then be free to develop a con
tractual agreement that fits their needs. Where management fears that
such a clause would be harmful to its interests, it would not be required
to agree to any type of investment clause.
The legal effect of the proposed policy change is significant. Under
present law, when a company voluntarily negotiates on and agrees to
a permissive subject, that subject is not automatically converted into
a mandatory subject. Although unilateral change in the clause might
be subject to arbitral adjudication, such change might not be illegal under
the NLRA, even during the term of an agreement. l2 Thus, such volun
tarily negotiated clauses do not provide the same measure of protection
as they would if the subject were mandatory. 13 Hence, the possibility
for union influence on job security would be substantially enhanced if
it had the right to negotiate with management concerning investment
decisions.
As noted above, including within the mandatory scope of bargaining
the right to negotiate about investment decisions would, in no way compel
management to agree to union proposals. On the other hand, it might
well be worth considering concessions in this area if a union were will
ing to modify its position with respect to other terms and conditions
in return for such commitments. On a voluntary basis, several of the
companies in this study made agreements with respect to new invest
ment, from new production lines to an entire steel mill, in return for
changes in work rules, wages, and benefits. Although this pattern is
possible in the existing legal context, making investment decisions man
datory would enhance the opportunity for unions to discuss these mat
ters with employers universally, not merely with enlightened manage-
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ment. It would also assure unions legal as well as contractual recourse
in the event that management reneged.
The case for a modification in labor law that would make investment
decisions a mandatory issue in bargaining is strengthened by a considera
tion of the pace of technological change in our society, the extent to
which new products and new technologies are being introduced, the
rapid change in the structure of markets with the increase in interna
tional competition, the change in market strength due to deregulation
within the economy, and other environmental changes that could be
enumerated. The employment uncertainty and insecurity over the last
decade, especially with respect to manufacturing, suggests that any union
constrained to the traditional narrow scope of bargaining wages, hours
and working conditions is likely to be less effective than it could be
in representing the long-term security interests of its members.

Conclusion
From a realist©s point of view, one might argue that converting in
vestment and plant closing decisions from permissive to mandatory issues
would have little effect in the absence of sufficient economic power
on the part of unions to achieve inroads at the bargaining table. One
might argue that public policy decisions with respect to mandatory sub
jects of bargaining really have no effect on bargaining behavior.
There is no presumption here that decisions or even legislation in this
area will have dramatic effects. As with any complex issue, no simple
one-step answer will achieve much. At the margin, however, public
policy change does influence the balance of power, and changes in
relative power alter the rational economic decisionmaking process ap
plied by the private decisionmakers. This study supports the proposi
tion that such change would be in the public interest.
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southern locations and consolidate production in Cleveland.
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that when a plant closing decision "turns" on labor costs, it is a mandatory
subject.
10. See opinion of Justice Blackmun in First National Maintenance Corp. v.
NLRB.

11. The question of whether advance notice should be required as a matter
of law is beyond the purview of this study. Many companies, including several
in this study, have voluntarily negotiated into their labor agreements a com
mitment to notify the union some minimal period of time prior to a closure
(or substantial layoff), however, e.g., Goodyear, General Mills.
12. Pursuant to Allied Chemical and Alkali Workers Local I v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Company, 404 U.S. 157 (1971), the employer is bound for the term
of the contract when it negotiates an agreement on a permissive issue only
when the agreement "vitally affects" the employees© terms and conditions
of employment.
13. In Jacobs Manufacturing Company, 94 NLRB 1214 (1951), enfd, 196
F.2d 680 (2d cir. 1952), the NLRB established that unilateral changes involv
ing mandatory issues are prohibited. Where the item is "contained in" the
contract, no change may be made during the term of the contract, even if the
employer has negotiated to impasse with the union. However, if the issue is
totally unforeseen and not contained in the contract, unilateral change is possible
after the parties have negotiated to impasse.
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